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Avengers Anti-Fraud Alliance

AAA CrYptOG Audit Report · Public draft

Prepared by CrYptOG On-chain forensic investigator · Avengers Anti-Fraud Alliance

Shavez's BitcoinCode:
the promise,
and the ledger

BitcoinCode is not Bitcoin, and has no connection to it (see why). In September 2023, members were promised a new Bitcoin: mined by NFT miners, priced by the market, run by the community, with nodes promised to members. This is that story told twice. First in the presenter's own words, then in the records of the chain he launched. Every balance is as at 24 September 2026, the day its only known public window went dark.

Prepared byCrYptOG · The Ledger
ChainBitcoinCode (BTCC), "BTC20 Smart Chain"
Records as at24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z, the explorer's last block
StatusPublic draft, 13 Oct 2026
§

The scale of it

Not a two-hop check on one wallet

A Reality Check follows one wallet for a hop or two. BitcoinCode needed more than that: the creator's complete transaction list, full histories of the wallets its money moved through, the pool's own records for as far as the explorer would give them up, and every mint read down to who signed it. Every figure in this report traces back to the bytes it came from.

371.4 MB

of BitcoinCode chain records, read from the operator's explorer and node on 11–12 October 2026: 16 saved pulls and reads, and 39 saved explorer replies.

the staking pool three full histories
  • The staking pool: two pulls stopped by explorer faults, kept as floors · 230.1 MB
  • Complete histories of [0x]c6aFd2, [0x]06aCe6 and the "bridge" · 78.5 MB
  • Explorer replies: the creator's 8 transaction pages, block pages, contract code · 41.5 MB
  • Earlier pulls, replaced by better ones · 16.5 MB
  • Paging diagnostics, probe and the 39 mint reads · 4.8 MB
175,000staking-pool transactions read2 Oct to 14 Dec 2023, from 11,075 addresses other than the creator. A floor: the explorer stopped the pull
7,845transactions in the creator's own listall 7,832 it sent, from nonce 0 with none missing, and 13 it received; 84 of them created contracts
19,366counterparties in one wallet's history[0x]06aCe6, the second-largest chain-"USDT" wallet read
39mint transactions read in fullevery signer identified: 35 the creator, 4 an address it switched on
15explorer faults cataloguedeach with the reply that shows it (§8.1)
285,065rows read from the pulls30,628 distinct addresses, all collision-checked

The Hashbook Engine

Beta · built by CrYptOG for investigations at this scale

Checking one wallet by hand works for one wallet. BitcoinCode meant reading an explorer that drops, repeats and reorders rows, and proving it was doing so. It meant decoding the creator's own calls, and keeping every address and every claim tied to its source. The Hashbook Engine is what made that possible.

  • Complete pullsPage-by-page histories from the explorer's API. Every page boundary is checked, and a pull stops and says why the moment the explorer contradicts itself.
  • Proof from the chainCalldata decoded against computed function fingerprints, and who signed each mint. Every address carries its checksum.
  • Tested analysisSix versions of the pull tool, each with a test suite that feeds it data built to make it fail.
  • The HashbookA register of tagged addresses, each with its basis, validated before it is accepted.
  • The canonEvery file hashed and logged, so any figure leads back to the exact bytes it came from.

The rising characters are the engine's own page check, lines 354–381 of the pull tool 1135_RIFT_t7-btcc-pull.mjs · 1b37ec218e2f.

How this report is told

Each chapter opens with a promise, dated and in the speaker's own words. Then comes the tell: the moment the chain's records give the game away. The detail follows, and each section ends with "How we know": the file, its hash, and what that file can and cannot establish. The narration has a voice, but the evidence doesn't.

Interactive · the one rule of this report

Trust the code, not the language.

"Miner", "mining", "USDT", "WBTC", "bridge" and "blockchain" are the scheme's words. This report quotes them as labels and tests each one against the code and the chain's records, never adopting them. Nothing rests on the investigator's say-so: every reading can be re-derived from the files under Evidence.

Tap a word the scheme uses, and zoom in on what the code says it is:

Every figure is dated

Every balance and holding is as at 24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z, the explorer's last recorded block (§8.2). None of them is "now".

Reading the marks

Established the file supports the claim, within its limits. Lead supported, not yet confirmed. Not established the records can't settle it. Each claim is also marked re-derived for this report, or NOT re-derived where it was carried from earlier notes.

Reading a tag

Addresses are written as a short tag, with the full address printed beside it so it can be checked. In the running text an address is shortened further, to its first six characters after the 0x, shown as [0x][0x]34cCC8. Every tag has four parts:

RIFT:CPTY:34cCC8-1Bb8Ba:CG
More detailwhat each part means · the two roles used here · the full role list
RIFT
The case file the tag was made in: CrYptOG's investigation of RIFT Protocol and the schemes before it.
CPTY
The role. Only two are used in this report; both are listed below.
34cCC8-1Bb8Ba
The first six and last six characters of the address, so it can be matched against any explorer's shortened display. Both ends, because a lookalike address is built to match the tail.
CG
Marks the tag as CrYptOG's own annotation, not a label applied by an explorer or any other platform.

A role word is a claim. It goes on an address only when a source establishes it. Until then the address takes one of the two defaults, which is why every tag in this report uses one of them:

CPTYCounterparty, role not fully verified yet.
CURIOAnomalous, worth watching, no role yet. Its behaviour is odd enough to watch, but nothing supports a role.
(no tag yet)Shown in full, not yet in the register, and submitted to it as a candidate.
The full role list

The roles below are the Hashbook's complete vocabulary. None of them is used in this report. Each goes on an address only when its own evidence test is met, and the register records which source met it.

SUBJECT
The address the case is about
COVICTIM
Swept or debited alongside the subject
BRIDGE
Bridge or cross-chain router
RELAYER
Submits transactions on others' behalf
SWAP
DEX router or aggregator
NOKYCSWAP
Cross-chain swap with no identity layer
CEXHOT
Exchange hot wallet, pooled
CEXDEP
Deposit address attributed to an account
TOKEN
ERC-20 or similar contract
PROXY
Upgradeable proxy
FACTORY
Deployment factory
DELEGATOR
EIP-7702 delegate target
SAFE
Multisig or Safe proxy
SWEEPER
Moves third parties' tokens under a standing allowance
COLLECTOR
Destination of swept funds
CALLER
The only address permitted to trigger a sweeper
DEPLOYER
Created the contract
DUSTER
Sends unsolicited dust
POISONER
Lookalike seeded into the subject's history
PASSTHRU
Receives and forwards quickly, retains nothing

A tag can also carry a flag at the end: ? role not established, ! an explorer or wallet shows a phishing or hack warning, or a digit where a role recurs in one case. No tag in this report carries one.

Source: HASHBOOK.md §1 and §3, the Hashbook's tag format and role vocabulary · d14cd7b35ba5. The CPTY wording above is this report's own.

Six kinds of source, and each statement says which it rests on:

More detailthe six sources, one by one
  • the operator's own explorer, scan.bitcoincode.technology, the only public window onto this chain found (§8.1 sets out how far it can be trusted);
  • published contract code, or creation inputs where none is published;
  • the presenter's recorded training, quoted from automatic captions with timestamps;
  • the promoter channel Crypto Tech SXM's recordings (22 Sep 2023, 14 Sep 2023, 16 Sep 2024), plus the presenter's update of 14 Feb 2024, whose publisher the file doesn't state;
  • BNB Chain's and Ankr's documentation;
  • public records outside the operator's control: Certificate Transparency logs and Companies House.
How we know
FigureSourceWhat it can establishStatus
371.4 MB, 16 pulls and reads and 39 explorer replies; 285,065 rows; 30,628 addresses Byte sizes and row counts of every BitcoinCode file in onchain-rpc/out/ and the 0009_–0033_ saves, counted 12 Oct 2026 What was read. Rows from pulls that were later replaced are counted, because they were read Establishedcounted 12 Oct 2026
175,000 pool transactions; 11,075 callersaddress-btcc-8e3c8431-20261012T012214Z.json.rows.partial · 9bf587ed8556 A floor for 2 Oct to 14 Dec 2023Establishedfloor
19,366 counterpartiesaddress-btcc-06ace60b-20261011T221304Z.json · 8288d6d548de Every address the pull records against [0x]06aCe6, the mint source includedEstablished
Six pull-tool versionsthe investigation's record of 11 Oct 2026, 22:35Z (2048, 2104, 2141, 2208); 1015_ and 1135_ on file The scripts and their test files, each hashedEstablished2048–2141 NOT re-derived
§

BitcoinCode is not Bitcoin

The name borrows Bitcoin's. Nothing else does

BitcoinCode ("BTCC", the "BTC20 Smart Chain") is a separate chain with its own coin. It isn't part of Bitcoin, it doesn't run on Bitcoin, and no code read in this investigation converts BTCC into bitcoin. Even its presenter drew the line at launch:

"21 million supply, [built] like Bitcoin blockchain. Don't ever say it's better than Bitcoin. We are really inspired by Bitcoin."22 Sep 2023 · 02:55–03:11
More detailBitcoin and BitcoinCode side by side · 7 points
BitcoinBitcoinCode, on the records
How coins come into existenceMined: each new block pays a reward to whoever did the proof of work for it All 21,000,000 BTCC sat in one address before that address's first transaction. The "mining" pays out of a pool that address filled (§2.2, §2.4)
Who makes the blocksAnyone with mining hardware Rotating signers: 11 different in 11 sampled blocks, at least 14 counting three seen on a presenter's screen. How they were admitted is not established (§4.2)
How oftenAbout every 10 minutes About every 3 seconds. The "10 minutes" is the pool's payout timetable (§4.1)
Who can read itAnyone, through their own node or many independent explorers One explorer and one named node, both on the operator's domain. Nothing new shown since 24 Sep 2026, as read on 12 Oct 2026 (§8.1)
What sets the priceTrading on many independent exchanges A swap pool, quoting BTCC against a "USDT" the creator made (§3.1)
Who can change the rulesNo single party The pool's code was replaced three times by its owner, [0x]34cCC8 (§4.3)
"WBTC"On other chains, a token backed by bitcoin held in custody The only "WBTC" read is a token [0x]34cCC8 created in Nov 2024. Nothing read connects it to bitcoin (see the two compared; §9.1, claim 8)

Interactive · flip the switch

Two tokens called "WBTC"

BitcoinCode does have a token called "WBTC". So does the wider crypto world. They share a name and nothing else. Flip between them and follow one coin through its life.

    In plain English

    Real WBTC works like a cloakroom ticket: a real coat, one bitcoin, hangs in a cloakroom anyone can inspect, and the ticket gets it back. BitcoinCode's "WBTC" is a ticket the venue prints for itself. No coat has been found behind it, and no counter has been found that would take the ticket back.

    Real WBTC: the WBTC network's own site, wbtc.network, and Etherscan's page for contract 0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599 ("Wrapped BTC", 8 decimals), both read 12 Oct 2026. BitcoinCode's "WBTC": its code as recorded in the claims register (0040_ row 8 · 78b412f69da4, NOT re-derived), and [0x]34cCC8's transaction list, page 7. Sources in full under "How we know" below.

    In plain English

    Calling a coin "Bitcoin Code" doesn't make it bitcoin, any more than calling a shop "Bank Street" makes it a bank. Where this report says BTCC, it means BitcoinCode's coin, never bitcoin.

    How we know
    ClaimSourceWhat it can establishStatus
    How Bitcoin works: proof-of-work block rewards, about one block every 10 minutes, open participation S. Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System" (2008), §4 and §6 Bitcoin's design, as publishedEstablishedpublic reference
    How real WBTC works: approved merchants, custody, 1:1 backing, minting and burning, on-chain proof of reserves wbtc.network, read 12 Oct 2026The issuer's own description of its design. Its custody arrangements are not tested here Establishedas published
    Real WBTC has 8 decimalsEtherscan, token 0x2260FA…c2C599, read 12 Oct 2026 The token contract's decimalsEstablished
    BitcoinCode's "WBTC": created by [0x]34cCC8 on 3 Nov 2024; unlimited minting by approved addresses; the owner can block any address; 18 decimals 0040_RIFT_btcc-shavez-claims-vs-chain.md row 8 · 78b412f69da4; creation 0028_RIFT_btcc-txinfo-create-53b71E.json · 52ccb0a683c8 Its published code, and its creation. Whether another "WBTC" existed in Sep 2023 is not established Establishedcode facts NOT re-derived
    Its first liquidity: 100 "WBTC" against 85,665 BTCC, 3 Nov 2024 13:46:03Z [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, page 7 · eae4f999d7f8; tx 0xcd9c88bd…5f67f1 The call and its argumentsEstablishedas called
    The quote1233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79 What the captions recordEstablishedas said
    Each BitcoinCode rowThe section linked in that rowAs that section's sources allow Establishedsee each section
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599
    0xcd9c88bdbe0ae6e8b20ed87c70c1af5f5f816b18363c4970d5cfd13f745f67f1
    0

    The short answer

    What a public blockchain gives you, and what BitcoinCode gives you

    A public blockchain is worth trusting for a handful of practical reasons: anyone can read it, anyone can check it, nobody alone decides who keeps it, and nobody alone prints its money. Here is BitcoinCode against each of them, with the section that shows it.

    A public blockchainfor example Bitcoin or Ethereum
    ?BitcoinCode, on the recordsthe BTC20 Smart Chain
    Anyone can read the whole ledger, through many independent windows.
    There is one window found in the operator's own explorer. It refuses or garbles whole-ledger reads in at least a dozen ways, and it has shown nothing since 24 Sep 2026 (§8.1, §8.2).
    Anyone can check it by running their own copy (a node) and comparing.
    There is one named node on the operator's domain, and its certificate expired on 24 Sep 2026. No independent node has been found (§8.2).
    Who keeps the ledger is open. On BSC, block producers are elected by stake every 24 hours, and anyone can stand.
    Block producers rotate among at least 11, one per sampled block. The creator registered a validator itself, with 1,000 BTCC, but that address isn't among the producers sampled. How the producers got in is not established (§4.2).
    Nobody alone prints the money.
    21,000,000 BTCC sat in one address at the start, and 103.1 million "USDT" was minted on the chain into two wallets, all of it by the creator or an address it switched on (§5.2).
    Value can leave.
    The only exit that has been read burns what goes in and has no code that pays the named destination. On 7 Jan 2024, [0x]34cCC8 removed chain-"USDT" from its supported list (§5.4).

    In plain English

    BitcoinCode runs blockchain software and produces blocks. But the things that make a public blockchain worth trusting are missing or unproven. You can only see it through the operator's window, and that window is broken and now dark. Its BTCC, and the chain-"USDT" read, trace back to one address. And no way of turning it into value outside the chain has been found.

    Skip to the verdict or read the story chapter by chapter. Dense detail in each chapter sits behind Tech detail.
    Chapter I · 5 September 2023

    "Users will be able to mine BTCC every 10 minutes"

    The pitch: NFT miners, electricity paid in fuel, a fixed 21 million, and a community in charge.

    1.1

    What was promised

    The training of 5 September 2023, in the presenter’s words

    The recording “WAAS Affiliate Marketing Training Sept. 5th 2023” is first in a YouTube playlist titled “BTCC Training by Shavez”, published by the channel “Crypto Tech SXM”. It is a recorded Zoom call. Three things on screen identify the presenter as Shavez:

    The channel is a third party’s. The label and the slide are the presenter’s own.

    The training recording on YouTube: a slide headed Affiliate Marketing 2.0 signed -SHAVEZ, a Zoom tile labelled SHAVEZ (BTC…), and the playlist BTCC Training by Shavez
    The training as published, 0:07 into the recording. Cropped from 0034_input_screenshot-yt-btcc-training-by-shavez-2023-09-05.png (sha256 a4f4f169131f…), region x 24–1852, y 96–800, to remove the viewer’s own account details.

    The NFT miners were the product. These are the five promises made about them. Read each one, then turn it over to see what the ledger shows.

    Interactive · tap a promise to turn it over

    Promise 1 of 5 · 5 Sep 2023
    “…will allow you to mine using NFT miners, Code 20 NFT miners, [ZEON] GT 1X, 10X, 100X, to mine some [BTCC].”00:17–00:42
    Turn over: what the ledger shows ↻
    The ledger False

    The NFTs contain no mining or reward code. "Mining" payouts reach holders only from a pool the creator filled from the 21 million it already held.

    §2.3 · claim 1 ↓
    Promise 2 of 5 · 5 Sep 2023
    “The [ZEON] GT1X, which is Bitcoin Code series miner, which is of hash power one kilowatt … which consumes 0.00278 B [fuel] every second.”04:56–05:18
    Turn over: what the ledger shows ↻
    The ledger Misleading

    "Hash rate" is a number the pool looks up from an unpublished contract that [0x]34cCC8 created and the owner can swap. No hardware, electricity or hashing appears in the code. The "fuel" was half destroyed and half sent to a receiver [0x]34cCC8 set to itself, under the published code.

    §9.1 · claims 2 and 3 ↓
    Promise 3 of 5 · 5 Sep 2023
    “Users will be able to mine BTCC every 10 minutes out of the total 7,200 coins [mined] daily till first [halving], that is four years.”14:36–14:47
    Turn over: what the ledger shows ↻
    The ledger Numbers true, label false

    The pool paid exactly 50 BTCC per 10 minutes, 7,200 a day, under both published versions of its code. It paid from its own balance, which the owner could withdraw in one call. A payout timetable from a pre-filled pool, not mining.

    the mining clock, §2.4 · claim 5 ↓
    Promise 4 of 5 · 5 Sep 2023
    “…and when there are more miners, the price goes up.”19:05–19:12
    Turn over: what the ledger shows ↻
    The ledger Contradicted

    The pool paid a fixed amount, shared by hash rate. Each miner added reduced every other holder's share. The price claim itself can't be tested on chain.

    §9.1 · claim 7 ↓
    Promise 5 of 5 · 5 Sep 2023
    “…the importance of limited supply of Bitcoin, so now everything is community's decision.”02:02–02:18
    Turn over: what the ledger shows ↻
    The ledger Contradicted

    One address created every contract read here except one swap pool, held the whole supply, filled the pool and set itself as fuel receiver. It replaced the pool's code three times.

    §4.3 · claim 11 ↓
    Tech detailnotes · about 1 min

    Square brackets mark words corrected from the automatic captions, which read “Xeon”, “btcs”, “B fuse”, “be fuel”, “mine”, “mind”, “Halloween”, “chaining” and “chain link”. Each quote links to its moment in the recording, so any reader can check it against what was said.

    In plain English

    The NFTs were sold as machines that mine new coins. They came with power ratings in kilowatts, a running cost paid in a “fuel” token, a Bitcoin-like schedule of 7,200 coins a day, and a community in charge. The rest of this section tests each of those against the records.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    The words quoted, at those times, as the automatic captions record them 0034_input_yt-transcript_waas-affiliate-marketing-training-2023-09-05.txt · 0a5ea7cfb6f2 The automatic captions of the published recording, with timestamps. Not a checked transcript Establishedas captioned · each quote links to its moment in the video
    The presenter is Shavez 0034_input_screenshot-yt-btcc-training-by-shavez-2023-09-05.png · a4f4f169131f The on-screen Zoom label, the slide signature and the playlist title Establishedas self-presented
    The training is dated 5 Sep 2023 the same screenshot The video title, and “Tue 5 Sep” on the shared screen’s clock Establishedas published
    1.2

    What a coin on this chain is

    Three possible sources, and a contract isn’t one of them

    BitcoinCode works like Ethereum. BTCC is the chain’s own coin, the way ether is Ethereum’s. On a chain of that kind, a coin can come into existence in only three ways, and all three are in the hands of whoever runs the chain:

    1. The starting allocation, written into the chain’s first block (the “genesis” block).
    2. Block rewards, if the chain’s rules pay any.
    3. A change to the chain’s rules, made by those who run the node software.

    A smart contract can’t do any of these. It can hold coins and pass them on, and nothing more. So a contract that “mines” BTCC can only be paying out BTCC that someone first put into it.

    In plain English

    If a product claims to mine a coin, ask where the coins come from. On this chain, a contract can only hand over coins it already holds.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    On an Ethereum-style chain, the native coin comes only from genesis, block rewards or a rule change; contracts can’t create it 2357_RIFT_btcc-mining-questions-for-readers.md · 1e40b9996eba The general rule for chains of this design, written up for readers Establishedgeneral rule
    BitcoinCode is a chain of that design 2355_RIFT_btcc-chain-mining-findings.md §2 · 1281132c7089 Block headers and an Ethereum-style interface, consistent with approved signers taking turns. The client software isn’t identified EstablishedNOT re-derived
    Whether blocks pay a reward the same file, §2 The explorer’s block-reward endpoint answered “HTTP 500” for every block asked Not established
    Chapter II · 22 September to 2 October 2023

    "Today the chain is live"

    Live22 Sep 2023 · the operator's explorer, on his screen: 21,789 blocks, 10 transactions
    Darktoday · its only known window has shown no new block since 24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z (§8.2)

    Launch week. The miner contracts arrived on the day promised. Mining didn't, and the 21 million had already sat in one address. Three years on, the line no longer holds: the chain's only known window went dark on 24 Sep 2026. Whether the chain itself still runs, or only its explorer stopped, is not established.

    2.1

    Launch week, as promised and as recorded

    The "Meeting Close Out" call of 22 September 2023

    The recording "Meeting Close Out Sept 22nd" is published on the same YouTube channel as the training, "Crypto Tech SXM". The speaker's Zoom tile is labelled "shavez". He spoke the night before launch ("it's already 11:15 my time"):

    "Today the chain is live, tomorrow the product is going to be live. In 24 hours the minting will start, and on 29th we will start mining."01:16–01:31
    "21 million supply, [built] like Bitcoin blockchain."02:55–03:01
    "We have created everything according to the numerology … that's why we are not minting today, we are minting tomorrow."14:06–14:15

    The tell

    The miner contracts kept their date. The mining didn't: the contract that pays it didn't exist until 2 October. And long before anyone could mine, all 21 million had sat in one address, the same one that launched everything.

    In plain English

    The launch kept to its timetable for the miners and slipped for the mining. The bigger point is what was already there before either one: every coin, in one wallet, before that wallet had sent a thing.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    The quotes, and the "shavez" Zoom tile 1233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79; 1233_input_screenshot-yt-meeting-close-out-2023-09-22_01.png · 8cc24fefe131 What the automatic captions record, and the tile's label. Captions can mishear words: the timestamp links let a reader check them against the video Establishedas said · not as true
    21,789 blocks and 10 transactions on 22 Sep 2023 1233_input_screenshot-yt-meeting-close-out-2023-09-22_01.png · 8cc24fefe131 What the operator's explorer displayed on the presenter's screen Leada screen, not a chain read
    [0x]34cCC8's first transaction and the creations of 23 Sep 2023 0029_RIFT_btcc-txlist-34cCC8-asc-p1-o1000.json · 81454e906785 [0x]34cCC8's own transactions, nonce 0 onward Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The pool's creation, start, pause, funding and unpause on 2 Oct 2023 0032_RIFT_btcc-txlist-34cCC8-asc-p2-o1000.json · 94759125fe07 The calls and their times. pause() and unpause() are named by their computed fingerprints 0x8456cb59 and 0x3f4ba83a Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    2.2

    21 million BTCC in one address, before its first transaction

    The supply was already there at the start

    At block 43,736, this address held exactly 21,000,000 BTCC. It had not yet sent or received a single transaction. Its first transaction (nonce 0) is in the next block, 43,737, on 23 Sep 2023 at 13:30Z. So no ordinary transaction delivered those coins to it. Transfers made inside contract calls weren’t checked.

    Tech detailnotes · about 1 min

    The explorer keeps no balance record for blocks 0 and 1, so it can’t show the starting allocation directly. A genesis allocation is the likeliest explanation, but it isn’t proven.

    The total has barely moved since. The explorer reports about 21.0027 million BTCC in all. That leaves at most about 2,700 BTCC that could have come from anywhere else in some 30.8 million blocks. That assumes there were no other starting allocations and that no BTCC was removed, for example by burning fees.

    21,000,000BTCC held by the creator at block 43,736, before its first transaction
    0transactions it had sent or received before then
    ≈21.0mtotal BTCC the explorer reports, as at 24 Sep 2026
    ≈2,700at most, from any other source, over about 30.8 million blocks

    In plain English

    The 21 million coins weren’t mined over time. They existed from the start, in one address: the one that went on to create the scheme’s contracts.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    [0x]34cCC8 held 21,000,000.000000 BTCC at block 43,736 0009_RIFT_btcc-ethgetbalance-34cCC8-43736.json · 51801a5f8031 The balance the explorer has stored for that block (0x115eec47f6cf7e35000000) Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Its first transaction is nonce 0 at block 43,737. Before that it has no transactions at all, and its sent transactions run 0–7,831 with no gap [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, 8 pages (0029_…p1 81454e906785; 0032_…p2–p8) 7,845 rows: 7,832 sent, 13 received, 23 Sep 2023 to 19 Aug 2026. The list is complete for the transactions it sent. Transfers made inside other contracts’ calls aren’t covered Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The explorer’s total is about 21.0027 million 0029_RIFT_btcc-stats-coinsupply.json a5b2e8f417c7; …ethsupply.json 0d41bbeaf2c8 The explorer’s own statistics: 21,002,696.98 and 21,002,706.77. Why they differ by about 10 isn’t established Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The 21 million was a genesis allocation 0006_RIFT_btcc-issuance-test.md · 73b1f223b21a Consistent with genesis, but not proof: the explorer has no balance record for block 0 Not established
    2.3

    The “miners” are plain NFTs

    No mining code, no output and no reward

    The ZEON “miners” are four NFT contracts. Three have published source. The explorer says the fourth is byte-for-byte the same code as the GT100X.

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min
    RIFT:CURIO:428638-dd821B:CG  ZEON GT1X
      0x4286388ad684515627464dF221b59Cc5C2dd821B
    RIFT:CURIO:c4256C-8A3A26:CG  ZEON GT1X (unverified)
      0xc4256CeE90c418DDE89163606532Ea6Ed98A3A26
    RIFT:CURIO:371d9C-E9e054:CG  ZEON GT10X
      0x371d9C99aBC64d90356B488f2b9Be56350E9e054
    RIFT:CURIO:286F43-0AcA80:CG  ZEON GT100X
      0x286F4310551D634Ef485a9bEE962f19cbb0AcA80
    What was said
    What the code does
    “will allow you to mine using NFT miners … to mine some [BTCC]”
    The contract has 29 functions Fifteen only read data. The other fourteen make an NFT, move one, destroy one or change a setting. None accepts payment, and there is no code for mining, output, rewards or withdrawals.
    “hash power one kilowatt”; “10 kilowatt, 100 horsepower”
    The NFT carries no power figure The “hash rate” is a number the payout pool looks up somewhere else (§2.4).
    A machine the buyer owns
    The owner can freeze every NFT and change every NFT’s picture and description. Those are kept on the operator’s web server, not on the chain.

    Only addresses on a list the owner keeps can create these NFTs. Creating one costs nothing at the contract, so whatever a buyer paid was paid somewhere else.

    In plain English

    A “miner” here is a numbered token with a name and a picture. It doesn’t do anything. Any payout comes from a different contract.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    29 functions (15 read-only, 14 that change state), none accepting payment, no fallback 0028_RIFT_btcc-src-428638-zeon-gt1x.json · dce3471f7ef6 The published code (ABI) of the GT1X contract, as the explorer serves it Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    No hash rate, power, output, claim, reward or timer anywhere in the code; “mine” appears only in the contract’s name 2355_RIFT_btcc-chain-mining-findings.md §3 · 1281132c7089 A reading of all 17 source files for [0x]286F43, [0x]428638 and [0x]371d9C EstablishedNOT re-derived
    [0x]c4256C is the same code as [0x]286F43 the same file, §3 The explorer’s own statement. [0x]c4256C’s source is unpublished EstablishedNOT re-derived · as the explorer says
    The mint list, freeze and picture-link powers; all four created by [0x]34cCC8 (23 and 29 Sep 2023) the same file, §3 The published code and each contract’s creation transaction EstablishedNOT re-derived
    2.4

    The pool that pays the “mining”

    Filled by the creator in one transfer, and paid out of its own balance

    RIFT:CURIO:8e3C84-8C92aE:CG 0x8e3C843104e155A90fcB0CF0deb6756D688C92aE The staking pool: an upgradeable contract. Its current code is unpublished.

    Members deposit (“stake”) their NFT miners in this pool. Under its published code, it paid BTCC at a fixed rate, shared between stakers according to a “hash rate” number. The code it has run since 22 Nov 2023 is unpublished (§4.3). The rate copies Bitcoin’s: 50 BTCC every ten minutes, which is 7,200 a day, for four years, then half that. Over all the periods together it comes to about 21 million.

    The creator · RIFT:CPTY:34cCC8-1Bb8Ba:CG Held 21,000,000 BTCC before its first transaction (§2.2).
    2 Oct 2023, 18:26:11Z · one plain transfer · 20,998,712.96 BTCC
    (plus 20 BTCC sent with start() at 04:00:08Z)
    The pool · RIFT:CURIO:8e3C84-8C92aE:CG Created by [0x]34cCC8 at 03:42:17Z the same day. It held 18,979,696.67 BTCC as at 24 Sep 2026, about 90% of all the BTCC the explorer reports.
    50 BTCC per 10 minutes, shared by each staker’s “hash rate” number
    Stakers Paid from the pool’s own balance (call{value: reward}). Before they’re paid, they must hand over BFUEL:
    50% destroyedburned by the pool
    50% to the fuelReceiverwhich [0x]34cCC8 set to itself at 03:46:59Z on 2 Oct 2023
    Tech detailaddresses · list · notes · about 1 min

    The “hash rate” is assigned, not measured. When a miner is deposited, the pool asks a separate “property” contract for that miner’s hash-rate and consumption numbers. That contract was created by [0x]34cCC8, and its code isn’t published, so how the numbers are set can’t be read. Each staker’s payout is their number divided by the total. So every miner added shrinks every other holder’s share.

    What the owner can do, in both published versions of the pool code:

    • recover(address) sends the pool’s entire BTCC balance to any address, with no condition.
    • Replace the code, because the pool is upgradeable.
    • Swap the contract that hands out hash-rate numbers (setProperty).
    • Pause the pool, and change the fuel token, the fuel split and its receiver.
    RIFT:CURIO:b116db-B0d0c2:CG  "property" contract (unpublished)
      0xb116dbC19873a6d8Dec92e960ef229ffbBB0d0c2
    RIFT:CURIO:700F05-4759f0:CG  StakingV1, the pool's first code
      0x700F05b0c90DCdd5d75ae7106fed7B7ed44759f0
    RIFT:CURIO:3558e7-6807eD:CG  StakingV1 v2 (from 16 Oct 2023)
      0x3558e707f29f589c99585B17bB217267B56807eD
    RIFT:CURIO:e99aD6-EA1B35:CG  BFUEL
      0xe99aD64420A20aF4d02806e2cCEBe693d4EA1B35

    Interactive · drag the date

    The mining clock against the ledger

    Under the published code, the pool paid 50 BTCC every 10 minutes from the moment [0x]34cCC8 unpaused it (2 Oct 2023 18:40:44Z). Drag through time to see what that timetable says had been "mined", and compare it with what the pool's balance shows actually left.

    Timetable: "mined" by this date
    Actually left the pool, as at 24 Sep 2026
    ≈ 2,019,036

    The bar scale is the 20,998,732.96 BTCC that [0x]34cCC8 put into the pool. Timetable: 50 BTCC per 10 minutes, published StakingV1 code (no halving falls inside this window). "Actually left" is 20,998,732.96 minus the 18,979,696.67 the pool held at 24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z, if nothing else ever entered it. Sources under §2.4 and §7.1.

    Open: where did about 2 million BTCC go?

    The pool received 20,998,732.96 BTCC from its creator: the transfer, plus 20 at start(). As at 24 Sep 2026 it held 18,979,696.67. If nothing else ever entered the pool, about 2.02 million BTCC have left it.

    Other inflows haven’t been fully checked, and neither has who received the payouts. An attempt to pull the pool’s full history (603,439 transactions by the explorer’s own page count, NOT re-derived) was stopped by the explorer faults in §8.1 and is parked. In the 175,000 transactions it did read (2 Oct to 14 Dec 2023), no one called recover, and the only BTCC sent in as transaction value, apart from the creator’s, was 0.1608 BTCC from two addresses. BTCC moved into the pool inside contract calls in that window wasn’t read: the internal pull stopped at an inbound block of 358,488.

    In plain English

    No mining code was found here. The creator put almost all 21 million coins into a pool, and the pool hands them out on a timetable. To collect, members pay in a fuel token. Under the published code, half of every fuel payment went to the creator’s own address. The creator also kept the power to empty the pool in a single step.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    [0x]34cCC8 created the pool, 2 Oct 2023 03:42:17Z, block 291,169 0029_RIFT_btcc-txinfo-create-8e3c84.json · e1eb4254eaed The creation transaction as the explorer lists it Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    One plain transfer of 20,998,712.95837571 BTCC from [0x]34cCC8, 18:26:11Z (tx 0x6db54866…78b787); 20 BTCC with start() [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, 8 pages The transactions [0x]34cCC8 sent. Its list is complete for those (nonce check, §2.2) Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    setFuelReceiver → [0x]34cCC8, 03:46:59Z (tx 0xae8fa84f…4410c6) the same list; selector 0x144441b4 computed The setting at that time. Whether it was changed by the later, unpublished code isn’t established Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The schedule (50 * 6 * 24 * 365 * 4), the fuel split (bFuelRate 50 / BASE_DIVIDER 100), recover sending the whole balance, payment by call{value}, and shares by hash rate 0029_…src-700f05-StakingV1.json 2b4442956efc; 0029_…src-3558e7-StakingV1.json be4511bf8fc5 The two published versions. Not the code running since 22 Nov 2023 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026 · published code only
    Pool balance 18,979,696.67 BTCC 0029_RIFT_btcc-balance-8e3c84.json · 4bc13d07708d The explorer’s stored balance, as at its last block Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The property contract is unpublished, was created by [0x]34cCC8, and has 55 transactions 2355_RIFT_btcc-chain-mining-findings.md §4 The explorer’s page for that contract EstablishedNOT re-derived
    BFUEL: 100,000,000 minted to [0x]34cCC8 when it was created, 1 Oct 2023 12:36:49Z 0028_RIFT_btcc-txinfo-create-e99aD6.json · 5dab87765aa5 The creation transaction and its Transfer log Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    About 2.02 million BTCC left the pool arithmetic on the rows above True only if there were no other inflows. Not yet checked Lead
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x6db54866bedbfd39757ebf5fd88f62367254b25c92d3cc9fb79fe3c6e278b787
    0xae8fa84f23c4fe19459456336ebd74f66cd4b576a9dcdf77037484e1fc4410c6
    Chapter III · 3 October 2023

    "It will be three dollars … because I am putting in liquidity"

    The opening price was promised to be set against wrapped Bitcoin. It was set against a "USDT" the creator had made 52 minutes earlier.

    3.1

    The first price

    How BTCC got a dollar value on day one

    "3,000 [BTCC] we will keep it for airdrop, and against that I will on call deposit wrapped Bitcoin in the liquidity … so now you can determine the price of BTCC even before mining. So it will be three dollars. It will not start from zero, it will be from three dollars, because I am putting in liquidity."22 Sep 2023 · 12:03–12:41

    The tell

    He did put in liquidity, and the price was three dollars to the cent. But the other side of the pair wasn't wrapped Bitcoin. It was a token labelled "USDT" that the same address had created less than an hour before.

    Interactive · tap a piece

    One address built almost the whole market

    Every piece below except two wallets was created by the same address, the one that held all 21 million BTCC. Tap any piece to see what it is, when it appeared, and where the report proves it.

    Every contract of the market read here, except the swap pool [0x]2C06D9, was created by [0x]34cCC8, the address that held all 21 million BTCC:

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min
    RIFT:CURIO:445465-0ED98E:CG  wrapped BTCC; created by [0x]34cCC8, 2 Oct 2023 04:09:59Z
      0x44546571729D1CC8c8DD680A36D80aD8E30ED98E
    RIFT:CURIO:6F8FC8-865e29:CG  swap router; created by [0x]34cCC8, 2 Oct 2023 04:20:17Z
      0x6F8FC88C42E829a6F7eE8B823E043CB1d4865e29
    RIFT:CURIO:9C80AF-d6001F:CG  "USDT" no. 1, 6 decimals; created by [0x]34cCC8, 3 Oct 2023 16:56:05Z
      0x9C80AF130278c14DB04A0bB2Cc9a0F0466d6001F
    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min
    RIFT:CURIO:7bB89C-ff3B0c:CG  "USDT" no. 2, 6 decimals; created by [0x]34cCC8, 5 Oct 2023
      0x7bB89Cb9184749888c718F99eC64D674Ccff3B0c
    RIFT:CPTY:aB472A-E7878A:CG  "USDT" no. 3, 6 decimals; created by [0x]34cCC8, 5 Oct 2023
      0xaB472AE141Cc0abE698Be3df227513367EE7878A

    Three "USDT"s

    A token's symbol is a label its creator chooses. Three different contracts on this chain call themselves "USDT", and [0x]34cCC8 created all three. None is Tether's USDT. This report tells them apart by address and never by name.

    Interactive · choose a view, tap a point

    Where BTCC's "price" came from

    Set by [0x]34cCC8's own liquidityPrice at the Harvest Party[0x]34cCC8 buying BTCC (upper bound)
    Tap a point for its source.

    Dollar values are BTCC priced in a "USDT" token on this chain, never in US dollars. The scale is logarithmic. "At most" points come from the minimum BTCC [0x]34cCC8's swap would accept. Sources under §3.1, §5.3 and §7.1.

    In plain English

    A price needs two things on either side of a trade. On day one, the coin on one side and the "dollar" on the other both came from the same wallet. A price set that way tells you what its maker chose, not what the market will pay.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    Creation of the wrapped BTCC, the router and the three "USDT" contracts by [0x]34cCC8 [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, page 2 (0032_…p2 · 94759125fe07); the 3 Nov 2024 entries are on page 7 (eae4f999d7f8) The creation transactions and their times Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The liquidity calls and their arguments: 290 BTCC + 870 "USDT" no. 1 (tx 0x1dbc44f8…37de44); the 5 Oct removal; the 22 Nov 2023 and 3 Nov 2024 additions (txs 0xd9056cb5…05dc90, 0xcd9c88bd…5f67f1) The same pages, calldata decoded for this report. addLiquidityETH = 0xf305d719; removeLiquidityETHWithPermit = 0xded9382a What each call asked for: amounts, and the minimums it would accept. The amounts actually moved need the receipts Establishedas called · amounts moved not read
    "USDT" nos. 1 and 2 are 6-decimal tokens labelled "USDT" address-btcc-06ace60b-20261011T221304Z.json · 8288d6d548de (per-asset summary); probe-btcc-20261011T210224Z.json · c7087bdc6f98 The explorer's label and decimals for each contract. A label is a lead, but the decimals fix the arithmetic Establishedexplorer record
    The router is the one in the Harvest Party swap of 16 Sep 2024 1221_input_screenshot-yt-harvest-party-2024-09-16_09.png · c738f9b94bfa MetaMask shows 0x6F8FC…65e29, which matches the router's first and last characters. The full address on that screen is cut off Leadpartial match
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x1dbc44f853fbbb53ad2131f3b0858306f953152e8e70e84fdb5b09a52c37de44
    0xd9056cb544f159c01063f19b715df3db21333d79a2929203bbd722087505dc90
    0xcd9c88bdbe0ae6e8b20ed87c70c1af5f5f816b18363c4970d5cfd13f745f67f1
    Chapter IV · 22 September 2023

    "If you have the node you have the control … I will have zero control"

    Nodes for members, fees for node owners, and a founder with no hand on the wheel.

    4.1

    The node, in the code

    What "connect your miner to the node" meant in code

    "Imagine you having a node and validating … you will make a lot of money. So what I have planned is I will not sell nodes [for] less than half a million dollars, because [nodes] will make [a] massive chunk of gas [fee] every 10 minutes."22 Sep 2023 · 07:57–08:23
    "Initially for our people we will give nodes like this … but the goal is to decentralize it."08:32–08:52
    "If you have the node you have the control, you have the power … I will have zero control."09:36–09:49
    "You and me, we will connect our miner to the node, and we will hit connect to the node together."13:07–13:18
    "This is how validator will look like … you will validate your address in one click."17:31–18:24

    The tell

    The "validator" he demonstrated was, in his words, a way to "click and submit your address" on the members' dashboard. "Connecting a miner to the node" meant handing it to a single pool contract, and in either published version that contract has no idea what a node is. None of [0x]34cCC8's own calls ever handed the pool to anyone else.

    Tech detaillist · about 1 min
    • The pool's code has no nodes. Both published versions of the pool contract (59 and 60 functions) were read. None registers, selects or pays a node or a validator. A miner is staked by sending the NFT to the one pool contract.
    • One validator registration. [0x]34cCC8's only call to the chain's Staking contract registered one validator address on 3 Oct 2023 (§4.2). That address isn't among the block producers seen.
    • Blocks every 3 seconds, not every 10 minutes. The operator's explorer said so, on his screen, the day of the call. The "10 minutes" is the pool's payout timetable, not block production.
    • "Zero control." [0x]34cCC8 replaced the pool's code three times, then made 21 calls naming 358 staked miners. In the 18 cases read, the miner went to [0x]34cCC8 (§4.3).
    • What members bought as "nodes". On CrYptOG's own information, nodes were bought, by individual members and by syndicates of members and teams who pooled their funds, and were paid for on TRON. Those purchases are not in the records read for this part, which reads only the BitcoinCode chain; a later part of this audit traces the TRON payments. What a node gave its buyer on this chain is the open question. A promoter's call a year later ties "node" to back-office accounts: "the accounts are already set up from the nodes that we were doing" (16 Sep 2024, 1:06:26). This is a lead only.

    In plain English

    Members were told a node meant a seat at the table and a share of the fees. On the chain, the only table was one pool contract, and one address owned it.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    The quotes1233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79 What the automatic captions record. Words in brackets are corrected from the captions ("more less", "notes", "gas feed") Establishedas said
    The pool's functions: none concerns nodes or validators 0029_RIFT_btcc-src-700f05-StakingV1.json · 2b4442956efc; 0029_RIFT_btcc-src-3558e7-StakingV1.json · be4511bf8fc5 The published code to 22 Nov 2023. The code since then is unpublished Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026 · to 22 Nov 2023
    Block producers: at least 14 different addresses seen 11 sampled block pages (§4.2); three more on the 22 Sep 2023 screen (1233_…_01.png) A floor. The three on screen are shown in part only, and none matches the 11 sampled Leadscreen for three of them
    The "validator" as an address-submission step on the dashboard1233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79, 17:31–19:13His description only. No screen of the form is heldLead
    "Nodes" tied to back-office accounts1221_input_yt-transcript_harvest-party-2024-09-16.txt · 4cfed7914a56 What a promoter said, a year laterLead
    4.2

    What it is built from

    BNB's toolkit for private, BSC-compatible chains, and how it differs from BSC itself

    BitcoinCode presents itself as the "BTC20 Smart Chain". Its records carry the fingerprints of a specific kit: the one BNB Chain's ecosystem offers for building separate, BSC-compatible networks (documented by Ankr as "BNB Sidechain"). In that kit, the chain's own management contracts sit at fixed addresses:

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min
    0x0000000000000000000000000000000000001000  Staking       (validator registration and stake)
    0x0000000000000000000000000000000000001002  SystemReward
    0x0000000000000000000000000000000000007003  ChainConfig

    All three appear in the BitcoinCode explorer's own account list. 0x…1000 holds 11,781.47 BTCC. The block headers have the shape of a proof-of-authority chain, in which approved signers take turns, rather than mining.

    The creator registered a validator. On 3 Oct 2023, [0x]34cCC8 made its only call to the Staking contract: registerValidator(address,uint16), matched by its computed function fingerprint 0x61cadbf4, with 1,000 BTCC attached. (The name comes from the kit's contract code, which isn't among the cited sources; the Ankr page lists the contract, not this function. The name is therefore a Lead; the call itself is established.) It registered this address, at a commission setting of 10:

    (no tag yet)  registered as a validator by [0x]34cCC8, 3 Oct 2023
      0x5fB621DE3407a8C7B6b2B02746BC65930cDa014A

    That address is not among the 11 block producers sampled. On 3 Nov 2023, [0x]c6aFd2 sent it 1,000.5 BTCC. Who controls it, and how the other block producers were admitted, are not established.

    Open: what were members' "validator nodes"?

    On 22 Sep 2023 the presenter said he would "not sell nodes [for] less than half a million dollars", then that "initially for our people we will give nodes like this", with "rules" and "eligibility" to come (§4.1). On CrYptOG's own information, nodes were bought, some by syndicates of members and teams pooling their funds, and paid for on TRON; those payments are not in the records read here, and a later part of this audit traces them. The 5 Sep 2023 training mentions a node only once, saying day-one miners would "be able to pledge their [miner] to the node" (12:59–13:08; the captions read "minor").

    On a chain built from this kit, a validator exists only if it is registered with the Staking contract at 0x…1000. So the question can be tested: read every call ever made to 0x…1000, list the validators registered and who registered them, and compare that with the block producers and with what members were sold. Until then, what a node gave its buyer on this chain is not established. This report does not say there was "only one" validator. The records show a rotating set of producers, and only one registration among the creator's own transactions.

    Tech detailtable · notes · about 1 min

    BSC compared. The same family of software, run in very different ways:

    BNB Smart Chain (BSC)BitcoinCode
    Who produces blocksValidators chosen by the BNB staked behind them, re-elected every 24 hours. "Any organization or individual can become part of the validator set", with a minimum self-stake of 2,000 BNB. A rotating set of signers: 11 sampled blocks had 11 producers. One validator was registered by the creator. How the others got in is not established.
    Ways to read itMany independent node providers and explorers. Anyone can run a full node. One explorer and one named node, both run by the operator. No independent copy found.
    Standard read calls (eth_call, eth_getLogs)Served by every provider.Refused, or no reply within 60 s (§8.1).
    The native coinBNB, traded on public markets.21,000,000 BTCC in one address before that address's first transaction (§5.1).
    Status on 12 Oct 2026Producing blocks.Explorer frozen since 24 Sep 2026. Whether the chain itself runs is not established (§8.2).

    In plain English

    The kit whose layout BitcoinCode shares is a legitimate tool for running a private chain with BSC's software. Running it doesn't make a chain public, independent or valuable. On BSC, outsiders can stand as validators, read the ledger through many providers, and check it themselves. On BitcoinCode, none of that has been shown.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sourceWhat it can establishStatus
    System accounts at 0x…1000, 0x…1002 and 0x…7003 on BitcoinCode 0029_RIFT_btcc-listaccounts-p1.json · 45098bc58144 The explorer's own account list (not sorted by balance), with balances Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Those addresses are the Staking, SystemReward and ChainConfig contracts of BNB's chain kit Ankr, "System smart contracts" The kit's documented layout. That BitcoinCode runs this exact kit is an inference from the matching layout and selector Leadread 12 Oct 2026
    registerValidator(0x5fB621…Da014A, 10) with 1,000 BTCC, 3 Oct 2023 13:39:26Z (tx 0xbab415c8…a635ef) [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, page 2 (0032_…p2 94759125fe07); selector computed The call, its arguments and its value. The function's name rests on the kit's code, which isn't cited here: a Lead Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Producers of 11 sampled blocks, all different, none of them 0x5fB621 block pages 0029_…page-block-* (12 files, each matching its save record) The producer of each sampled block. 11 blocks can't establish the size of the set Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    [0x]c6aFd2 sent 1,000.5 BTCC to 0x5fB621, 3 Nov 2023 address-btcc-c6afd23a-20261011T221241Z.json · 258cc145b950 The transfer. Not who controls either address Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Proof-of-authority header shape (difficulty 2, nonce 0, gas limit 8,000,000) 2355_RIFT_btcc-chain-mining-findings.md §2 · 1281132c7089 The sampled headers. The client software isn't identified EstablishedNOT re-derived
    How BSC chooses validators; who may join; minimum self-stake BNB Chain docs, "Staking overview" BSC's published design, read 12 Oct 2026 Establishedas published
    BSC is served by many independent node providers Chainstack; OnFinality That third-party providers offer BSC access Establishedas published
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x5fB621DE3407a8C7B6b2B02746BC65930cDa014A
    0xbab415c8456da1518daabf69d27fa6aff566b630217b6815740e4bb220a635ef
    4.3

    [0x]34cCC8 changed the rules, and took miners out

    Three code changes, the last two unpublished; 21 calls naming 358 staked miners, and those read sent miners to [0x]34cCC8

    Every change was sent by [0x]34cCC8, the pool’s owner from its creation. None of [0x]34cCC8’s 7,832 transactions hands ownership of the pool to anyone else.

    Tech detailtable · addresses · notes · about 1 min
    When (UTC)What [0x]34cCC8 did to the poolCode
    2 Oct 2023 03:42Creates it, running StakingV1 ([0x]700F05)published
    2 Oct 04:25–18:40Pauses it, funds it at 18:26, unpauses it–
    16 Oct 2023 04:20upgradeTo → StakingV1 v2 ([0x]3558e7)published
    21 Nov 2023 10:05pause()–
    21 Nov 14:32upgradeTo → [0x]960a62not published
    21 Nov 14:53–15:3421 calls to a function that isn’t in the published code (0x5c9ed683), naming four holders and 358 staked minersnot published
    22 Nov 02:12unpause()–
    22 Nov 2023 06:36upgradeTo → [0x]978a93. The pool has run on this code ever since, as far as the explorer records up to 24 Sep 2026not published
    RIFT:CURIO:960a62-c7D550:CG  unpublished, from 21 Nov 2023
      0x960a6279E55C6E0635fea61CFa268376Dcc7D550
    RIFT:CURIO:978a93-2EE710:CG  unpublished, from 22 Nov 2023
      0x978a93FBFf996d5C87bE5D5616354327be2EE710

    21 November 2023. The pool had been paused since 10:05. At 14:32 it was switched to unpublished code. About twenty minutes later, [0x]34cCC8 began 21 calls. Each named one holder’s address and a list of miners. Together they named 358 miners: 267, 48, 38 and 5 across the four holders.

    Interactive · switch the view

    358 miners, named in 21 calls on one afternoon

    Each dot is one staked miner named in [0x]34cCC8's 21 calls of 21 Nov 2023 (14:53–15:34Z): 267, 48, 38 and 5 across four holders. The logs of two calls have been read. They show 18 miners, every one sent by the pool to [0x]34cCC8. Which holders those 18 belonged to isn't shown here. Sources under "How we know" below.

    Tech detaillists · notes · about 1 min

    The logs of two calls have been read:

    In every case read, the pool sent the miner to [0x]34cCC8, not to the holder named, and logged it as MinerWithdrawn with [0x]34cCC8 as the withdrawer. So the move is established for 18 of the 358 miners. For the rest it rests on the calls’ identical form.

    Two of the miners can be followed from start to finish:

    • 10 Nov 2023, 20:56 and 20:58: GT1X #48020 and #48021 were minted to one of the four holders.
    • 21:08 the same day: that holder staked both in the pool.
    • 21 Nov: a call by [0x]34cCC8 moved both to [0x]34cCC8.

    That holder’s GT1X record shows 309 miners received and 309 staked. Up to its last row, on 16 Dec 2023, none ever came back from the pool.

    What this does not establish

    • Who controls the four holder addresses. They could be linked to [0x]34cCC8, or they could be members.
    • Why the miners were moved, and whether the holders were compensated elsewhere.
    • What the unpublished function does beyond the transfers seen.

    This report doesn’t characterise the holders, and doesn’t publish their addresses.

    Tech detailnotes · about 1 min

    [0x]34cCC8 also used the pool as a staker. It staked miners and claimed payouts, the last claim on 29 May 2026. That claim is identified by its function fingerprint, which matches the published getExactReward. [0x]34cCC8’s own record has no call to recover on the pool. It did call recover on a different contract it had created, on 2 Oct 2023 (0015_ §5). A call to the pool made through another contract, or by a later owner, wouldn’t appear there, so the pool’s full history is being read for it (§2.4).

    In plain English

    Whoever controls the pool's owner address could change what it does at any time, and did. Since 22 Nov 2023 it has run on unpublished code, which the explorer would not show when read on 11–12 Oct 2026. The day before, using code it had just installed, [0x]34cCC8 made 21 calls naming 358 miners that other addresses had staked. In each of the 18 cases read so far, the miner went to [0x]34cCC8 itself.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    The upgrades, pauses and unpauses, at those times [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, 8 pages; selectors computed (keccak-256 tested against a published vector) The calls [0x]34cCC8 sent to the pool, and their targets Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    No transfer of ownership the same list None of [0x]34cCC8’s calls to the pool is transferOwnership or renounceOwnership. Doesn’t exclude an owner change made by the unpublished code, or through another contract Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026 · direct calls only
    21 calls, 358 miners, split 267 / 48 / 38 / 5 the same list; call inputs decoded What each call named. All 21 succeeded Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Miners sent to [0x]34cCC8; MinerWithdrawn with [0x]34cCC8 as the withdrawer 0032_…txinfo-0xffc2a7a0.json b62f3730cbfb; 0032_…txinfo-0x0278d07a.json 8af1abf353d6 0x0278d07a: complete logs, 1 of 1 miner. 0xffc2a7a0: first log page only (50 entries, next_page_params set), 17 of 20 miners. Every transfer seen goes from the pool to [0x]34cCC8 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026 · 18 of 358 miners
    The same, for #48537–#48539 and the other 19 calls their identical form Inference from form Lead
    #48020 / #48021: minted, staked, moved; 309 in, 309 staked, 0 back 0032_…tokentx-…-428638.json d66db96c14ef; txinfo 0xffc2a7a0 That holder’s GT1X transfers (618 rows, to 16 Dec 2023) and the 21 Nov transfer to [0x]34cCC8 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Chapter V · 22 September 2023 onward

    "My only job will be to collect as much [BTCC] as possible from you guys"

    Mined coins in, nothing out: a "USDT" minted by the million, a "bridge" that burns, and a creator buying BTCC with a "USDT" of its own making.

    5.1

    Who writes the money?

    Anyone could send transactions; one address, [0x]34cCC8, held the BTCC, minted the "USDT" read, and changed the pool's rules

    In the first 175,000 pool transactions (2 Oct to 14 Dec 2023, a stopped pull, so a floor), 11,075 addresses other than the creator sent transactions to the staking pool, and 11,061 of them had at least one succeed. At least 1,314 different addresses used the chain's "bridge", [0x]556Da7 (§5.4), between 9 Oct 2023 and 7 Jan 2024. It worked as a withdrawal request, not a bridge: it burned the chain-"USDT" and recorded the TRON address typed in. Any real USDT paid on TRON had to come from whoever runs the TRON side, on a different chain entirely. Even that route closed on 7 Jan 2024, when [0x]34cCC8 removed "USDT" from it. What came from one address, [0x]34cCC8, was the money members used and the pool's rules (§2.2 to §4.3).

    RIFT:CPTY:34cCC8-1Bb8Ba:CG 0x34cCC892b67C873853D7a7050f5Df5B2781Bb8Ba The creator of every contract in this section except the swap pool [0x]2C06D9. Who controls it is not established.
    5.2

    103.1 million "USDT", minted on the chain

    Taken together, most of what reached the two largest chain-"USDT" wallets read was created there, by the creator

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min
    RIFT:CPTY:aB472A-E7878A:CG  the chain's "USDT" token (source unpublished)
      0xaB472AE141Cc0abE698Be3df227513367EE7878A
    RIFT:CPTY:c6aFd2-36e27C:CG  the largest chain-USDT wallet read
      0xc6aFd23A13d420828d424E327A7de4d5bA36e27C
    RIFT:CPTY:06aCe6-3dCAA0:CG  the second largest read
      0x06aCe60b5D5cC887a79AC111dEeF88B5453dCAA0

    A token named "USDT" on this chain is not Tether's USDT. It is a contract on BitcoinCode whose source isn't published. When the token's records show a transfer from the zero address, that is new tokens being created (minted). The two largest chain-USDT wallets read in full received:

    Tech detailtable · addresses · lists · notes · about 2 min
    walletminted to itmintsfrom other wallets
    [0x]c6aFd267,011,087.1013[0x]06aCe6 37.0%; one other address 10.4%; a swap pool on the chain 3.0%
    [0x]06aCe636,100,001.002632.3% from 19,339 other addresses, none above 1%
    together103,111,088.1039about 91% of the explorer's stored supply record of 113,746,433.63

    The mints are round, repeated amounts.

    • 06aCe6: 26 mints between 5 Oct 2023 and 6 Jan 2024. Twenty of them were 1 million or more: 2,000,000 twelve times, 1,000,000 six times, 1,500,000 once and 3,000,000 once. The other six were 500,000 twice, 450,000, 100,000, 50,000, and a single token.
    • c6aFd2: five small mints in October 2023, under 6,000 each. Then 12,000,000 once, 10,000,000 four times and 5,000,000 three times, between 24 Nov 2024 and 21 Mar 2025.

    Round millions, repeated, into the same two wallets, don't look like members' deposits arriving from another chain. What they are depends on who signed them (below).

    Where it went. [0x]06aCe6 passed 98.4% of what it sent out to [0x]c6aFd2. [0x]c6aFd2 sent 82.1% of its outflow, 110.6 million, into one swap pool on the chain, and 15.9%, 21.5 million, to one other address:

    RIFT:CURIO:2C06D9-833d5b:CG  a swap pool on the chain; label "UNI-V2", token pair not established
      0x2C06D97870Ea6931D49A130544B012Db5D833d5b
    (no tag yet)                 21.5M from [0x]c6aFd2 and 0.36M from [0x]06aCe6
      0x73985398366F13A5440689c5079ec61853dc1c8e

    Who minted it: the creator. All 39 mint transactions were read. Each called the token's mint(address,uint256), matched by computed fingerprint 0x40c10f19, and each succeeded.

    • 35 were signed by [0x]34cCC8, totalling 103,100,006.82: all 26 mints to [0x]06aCe6, and 9 to [0x]c6aFd2, including every large one.
    • 4 were signed by a second address, totalling 11,081.28, all to [0x]c6aFd2, between 6 and 13 Oct 2023. That address could mint only because the creator allowed it to. At 06:38:05Z on 6 Oct 2023, [0x]34cCC8 called the token's setManage(address,bool) (fingerprint 0x40579eb5; the token's source is unpublished, so the name rests on the fingerprint) with this address and true. A minute later it sent the address 3 BTCC for fees. At 06:42:50Z on 24 Oct 2023 it called setManage again with false.
    (no tag yet)  allowed to mint by [0x]34cCC8, 6-24 Oct 2023; signed 4 small mints
      0xD6C3b1a1b70F1b10d886f4B6964cD225d861dDE0

    Nothing in these transactions brings value from another chain. Each is the creator, or an address it switched on, calling mint. What, if anything, stood behind the minted tokens is not established. That question is on the TRON side (§5.4).

    In plain English

    Most of the "dollars" that reached the two largest wallets read were typed into existence by one address, the creator [0x]34cCC8, in round millions, and not brought in from outside. A token called "USDT" is only as good as whatever stands behind it, and nothing standing behind these has been shown.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    Mints, other sources and destinations for [0x]c6aFd2address-btcc-c6afd23a-20261011T221241Z.json · 258cc145b950 Every chain-USDT row the explorer lists for [0x]c6aFd2 to head 30,834,158, less 7 token rows it left out. Inbound span 5 Oct 2023 to 10 Jun 2025 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The same for [0x]06aCe6address-btcc-06ace60b-20261011T221304Z.json · 8288d6d548de The same scope, less 58 token rows left out. Inbound span 5 Oct 2023 to 1 Apr 2026 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Explorer supply record 113,746,433.63SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-11_2235Z.md §2 The explorer's stored token record, read 11 Oct 2026. Not a chain read EstablishedNOT re-derived · explorer record only
    Who signed each of the 39 mints; function called; success; the mint log matches the call's arguments btcc-usdt-mint-txinfo-20261012T105758Z.json · c2087327ed0d (by 1200_RIFT_btcc-usdt-mint-txinfo.mjs · 46e635f61d4f) Every gettxinfo reply in full, each with its own hash. Read 10:57Z on 12 Oct 2026 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    setManage(0xD6C3b1…61dDE0, true) 6 Oct 2023 06:38:05Z; 3 BTCC to it at 06:39:17Z; setManage(…, false) 24 Oct 2023 06:42:50Z [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, 8 pages; selector computed The calls and their arguments. The function's name rests on the fingerprint, because the token's source is unpublished Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0xD6C3b1a1b70F1b10d886f4B6964cD225d861dDE0
    5.3

    Collecting the BTCC

    The creator buys BTCC with its own "USDT"

    "On 30th this reward that we mine, BTCC that we [mine], will be accepted … will not be given in withdrawals, will be accepted in deposits."22 Sep 2023 · 01:31–01:49
    "My only job will be to collect as much [BTCC] as possible from you guys, because I have to force you all to sell, and mostly sell it to me, so that we can … go for listings."09:49–10:09

    The tell

    The chain is consistent with it. In May 2025, [0x]34cCC8 swapped 3.5 million of its own "USDT" for BTCC through its own router. That "USDT" is a token [0x]34cCC8 created, and every mint of it read was signed by [0x]34cCC8 or an address it had switched on.

    Tech detailtable · about 1 min
    when (UTC)[0x]34cCC8 paid infor at leasttx
    9 May 2025 10:58:041,500,000 "USDT" no. 312,534.38 BTCC0x6ca4d06a…b0f6ab
    16 May 2025 02:39:321,000,0007,943.47 BTCC0xbb8c7782…3edccf
    16 May 2025 02:40:141,000,0006,444.25 BTCC0xb2a283c7…7c7834
    total3,500,00026,922.10 BTCC
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x6ca4d06ad0009c84226f56375512e16f819b83b9122f292779e6ed0211b0f6ab
    0xbb8c7782a9bc6b438524f080c9a28b76472f86aa1701c2eb1868c2de573edccf
    0xb2a283c738a0c6f2cec45063cca724f023112dbb4b1dddef4a7fc9d0b47c7834

    In May 2025, [0x]34cCC8 made three purchases of BTCC, listed in the table under Tech detail above. How much BTCC each swap actually delivered hasn't been read, but each swap instruction named the least BTCC [0x]34cCC8 would accept. So it received at least those amounts, and paid at most about $120 to $155 per BTCC. Where its "USDT" came from isn't established, since all 39 of its mints that we read from the BitcoinCode explorer went to two other wallets (§5.2), but it already held at least 1,000,000 of it on 31 Jan 2025, when it put that sum into a pool against another token it had created and took the liquidity back out 48 minutes later. Whether the listings promised in September 2023 ever happened was not tested.

    In plain English

    A swap pool trades against whatever has been put into it. In May 2025 the creator's address bought BTCC from those pools, paying in "dollars" from a token it had created. Whose BTCC it bought is not established.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    The three swaps and their arguments 0032_RIFT_btcc-txlist-34cCC8-asc-p8-o1000.json · cde056f0cc80; calldata decoded (swapExactTokensForETH = 0x18cbafe5) Amounts in, the minimum BTCC accepted, and the path ("USDT" no. 3 → wrapped BTCC). The BTCC actually received needs the receipts Establishedas called · floors
    31 Jan 2025: 1,000,000 "USDT" no. 3 added against token 0x4f8815…Fd3fa5 (tx 0x217ec7d9…527a04), all LP removed at 15:34:34Z (tx 0x4dfde748…30cc3b)0032_…p8 · cde056f0cc80The calls. A round trip of [0x]34cCC8's own deposit, so not a source of its "USDT"Establishedas called
    The quotes1233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79 What the captions recordEstablishedas said
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x4f8815933cE09c9F2c9435414b3dbeF423Fd3fa5
    0x217ec7d93a446194cdf1ef7f888655238b43268b50448d77693d41ea03527a04
    0x4dfde7484a1f612c037400e62fc7024326867ae761ded45969a9585ed830cc3b
    5.4

    A sealed economy

    Assets one address could create, and no established route to value off the chain

    For a token on this chain to be worth something outside it, there has to be a way out: a bridge that pays real money on another chain, or an exchange that takes it. This is every route out that the investigation has read.

    A withdrawal request, not a bridge. The chain's "bridge", [0x]556Da7, moves nothing between chains. A member sent it chain-"USDT" and typed in a TRON address; the contract burned the "USDT" and recorded the address. Any real USDT paid on TRON had to come from whoever runs the TRON side, on a different chain entirely. Whether it was paid, to whom and how much is traced in a later part of this audit, from the burn list filed with this one. This route closed on 7 Jan 2024.

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min

    The "bridge" burns what goes in. It is a withdrawal request, not a bridge. The only "bridge" contract read is this one:

    RIFT:CPTY:556Da7-fA82f1:CG  the "bridge" contract ("bridgeToken")
      0x556Da75f8b248DDb9b133Dd71bc2CAB7BbfA82f1

    Animation · how the "bridge" worked

    In one side, out of nowhere

    Members 1,314+ addresses "USDT" the “bridge” 556Da7 every unit burned no code path pays TRON the address they typed ? CLOSED7 Jan 202407:41:01Z
    Burned: 0.00 chain-"USDT"

    At least 1,437,295.80 chain-"USDT" from at least 1,314 addresses, 9 Oct 2023 to 7 Jan 2024, every unit burned. [0x]34cCC8 removed "USDT" from the "bridge" 8 minutes 30 seconds after the last burn. Whether anyone was paid on TRON is not established. Sources under "How we know" below.

    Tech detaillist · notes · about 2 min
    • What its code does. It takes the full amount from the user and destroys (burns) it. It computes a fee of 3% plus a fixed fee that [0x]34cCC8 set and changed. It records whatever text the user typed as the destination, and never checks it. No code path pays anything to the destination, on this chain or elsewhere. Where the fee goes is not stated in the decode.
    • How it was used. Between 9 Oct 2023 and 7 Jan 2024, at least 1,314 different addresses sent it at least 1,437,295.80 chain-USDT, every unit burned. (The explorer left 38 token rows and 1 internal row out of the pull, so both are floors.) 99.4% of the value named a TRON address as its destination.
    • How it ended. At 07:41:01Z on 7 Jan 2024, 8 minutes 30 seconds after the last burn, [0x]34cCC8 removed chain-USDT from the "bridge"'s supported list. Nothing later is listed, up to the explorer's last block.
    • What would have had to happen next. Any payment to members on TRON would have been a separate act by whoever runs the TRON side. Whether any was made is not established. The full list of burns, with each named TRON destination, is with the HyperFund investigation, for matching against the TRON records.

    "WBTC" is a token made on this chain by [0x]34cCC8. The only contract named "WBTC" read on this chain was created by [0x]34cCC8 on 3 Nov 2024. Approved addresses can create more of it, and its owner can block any address. Nothing read connects it to Bitcoin.

    The swaps stay inside. The chain has its own swap pools, labelled "UNI-V2". [0x]c6aFd2 sent 110.6 million chain-USDT into one of them. Which tokens each pool pairs is not established. Pools like these give tokens a price, but only against each other, inside the chain.

    Interactive · switch the view

    "USDT" minted into one wallet, against "USDT" burned at the "bridge"

    Minted into [0x]06aCe6 (by [0x]34cCC8)Burned at the "bridge", by every user together

    The mints into [0x]06aCe6 ran from 5 Oct 2023 to 6 Jan 2024: 36,100,001 in 26 mints. The "bridge" took burns from 9 Oct 2023 to 7 Jan 2024: 1,437,295.80 from 1,314 addresses, a floor. This chart shows the two side by side and does not establish a link between them. Weeks start on Monday. Sources: btcc-usdt-mint-txinfo-20261012T105758Z.json · c2087327ed0d; address-btcc-556da75f-20261011T222233Z.json · 506a46c9a3fe.

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min

    The only way out described: the operator's back office. A year after launch, the promoter Crypto Tech showed the WAAS back office on screen (16 Sep 2024). It offers a "DeFi Deposit Wallet (BTC20)" that takes the chain's "USDT" for subscriptions. A viewer on the call read the "DeFi Income Wallet" withdrawal as "USDT TRC20" (1:09:01–1:09:05); the reply in the captions is unclear. Of the "bridge", a voice on the call says "we're not using the bridge" (45:48). So in September 2024, the only exit described ran through a back office, not through any code on the chain. Whether anyone was paid this way is not established. A WAAS deposit screen from 14 Sep 2023 shows a TRON USDT deposit address. Its checksum is valid, and the QR code beside it decodes to the same string:

    (TRON; no tag)  TRON USDT deposit address on a WAAS deposit screen, 14 Sep 2023 (recording)
      TSrzRHrUeRBgfiJDx49VCS98QB6XLgLGFU

    What this does and doesn't show

    Established: all 21,000,000 BTCC sat in one address, [0x]34cCC8, before its first transaction (how they got there is not established); every chain-USDT mint read, 103.1 million, was signed by [0x]34cCC8 or by an address it had enabled; and the one exit read destroys what goes into it. Not established: that no member was ever paid on TRON, or that no other exit exists. "Zero value" overstates what the records show, because the tokens do trade at prices inside the chain. The accurate statement is that no route to value off this chain has been found.

    In plain English

    Think of an arcade that prints its own tokens and runs its own prize counter. The tokens buy things inside the arcade. The only cash-out desk anyone has examined shreds the tokens and writes down where you'd like the money sent, and in January 2024 that desk stopped taking the arcade's "dollars". Whether anyone was ever paid is a question for the other side of the desk, and nobody has shown that they were.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    The "bridge"'s code: burns the full amount, 3% fee, stores the destination unchecked, no payout path SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-11_2320Z.md §2 · c2d83d96cd9d; 2250_RIFT_556da7-bridgeToken-decode.py · a34a62e91d05 The creation bytecode, as deployed, including the fee arithmetic and the owner-set fixed fee. Live code can't be read (§8.1, fault 3) EstablishedNOT re-derived
    1,437,295.80 burned, 1,314 senders, 9 Oct 2023 to 7 Jan 2024; 99.4% naming TRON address-btcc-556da75f-20261011T222233Z.json · 506a46c9a3fe; 2320Z §2 Every "bridge" call and transfer the explorer lists, to head, less 38 token rows and 1 internal row it left out: floors EstablishedNOT re-derived
    removeToken(chain-USDT) by [0x]34cCC8, 8 min 30 s after the last burn 2320Z §2.5The admin call and its time EstablishedNOT re-derived
    Anything paid on TRON against the burns with the HyperFund investigation: BURNLIST_btcc-556da7-bridgeToken_2026-10-11_2250Z.csv · 732ce2ffd683 —Not established
    "WBTC" created by [0x]34cCC8, 3 Nov 2024 0028_RIFT_btcc-txinfo-create-53b71E.json · 52ccb0a683c8 The creation transactionEstablishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    "WBTC" mintable by approved addresses; owner can block any address 0040_ row 8 · 78b412f69da4The published code EstablishedNOT re-derived
    Swap pools labelled "UNI-V2" on the chain Hashbook batch 2228Z (three tagged); [0x]c6aFd2 fileThe contracts and the flows through one of them. Their token pairs are not established Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026 · flows only
    Chapter VI · 14 February 2024

    "I will also have one vote. We all will be equal"

    A DAO "registered in United States", a governance token on BTC20 Smart Chain, one member, one vote.

    6.1

    The DAO and the register

    Valentine's Day 2024, UK prime time

    "We are going to … unveil the Affiliate Marketing 3.0 [DAO], which is registered in United States. It is going to be a decentralized autonomous organization."26:49–27:03
    "Every member of [We Are All Satoshi] is going to have one vote, a governance token of our own on [BTC20] Smart Chain."28:51–29:07
    "We are going to unveil the governance token, the smart contract, in our event."30:16–30:23
    "I will also have one vote. We all will be equal in this organization."31:06–31:16

    The tell

    The only registration found for an "Affiliate Marketing 3.0" is a UK partnership, formed 19 months later. On its register, one member holds more than half (and under three quarters) of the votes and can appoint or remove a majority of its management. That member is recorded as Shavez Ahmed Siddiqui.

    Tech detailaddresses · lists · notes · about 1 min
    • On the chain. [0x]34cCC8 created two contracts on 22 Feb 2024, three days before the Dubai event of 25–27 February where the token was to be unveiled. What they are has not been read.
    RIFT:CURIO:8E421B-f8B9B9:CG  created by [0x]34cCC8, 22 Feb 2024 09:21:13Z; purpose not established
      0x8E421B92A26721C46332D063b883a4e8e1f8B9B9
    RIFT:CURIO:c582da-42DF0e:CG  created by [0x]34cCC8, 22 Feb 2024 09:21:22Z; purpose not established
      0xc582da428B307991771046cbFEda909f5642DF0e
    • On the register. Affiliate Marketing 3.0 LLP (OC458239) was registered in the UK on 24 Sep 2025. Its two designated members are Shavez Ahmed SIDDIQUI and Joseph TRZEJA. Siddiqui is recorded as holding more than 50% and less than 75% of the voting rights, the same share of surplus assets, and the right to appoint or remove a majority of the management (who is named).
    • What this can't establish. That the LLP is the "DAO" promised. The names match, nothing more. A US registration hasn't been searched for.

    Interactive · switch the view

    "One vote each", and the register

    Shavez Ahmed Siddiqui · more than 50%up to 75%the rest

    Promise: "every member … is going to have one vote … I will also have one vote. We all will be equal" (14 Feb 2024, 28:51–31:16). Register: Affiliate Marketing 3.0 LLP, OC458239, person with significant control holding more than 50% and less than 75% of the voting rights. The register can't establish that the LLP is the DAO promised. Sources under "How we know" below.

    In plain English

    "One member, one vote" was the promise. The one company on record with that name gives one member the majority of the votes.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    The quotes1233_input_yt-transcript_ceo-shavez-session-2024-02-14.txt · 7041cdefe3b2 What the captions recordEstablishedas said
    Two contracts created by [0x]34cCC8 on 22 Feb 2024 (txs 0x15bd9ba9…99223e, 0x56b54fbd…2f815f) [0x]34cCC8 transaction list, page 4The creations. Not what the contracts are Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The LLP's members and person with significant control 0055_input_companies-house-OC458239-llin01-2025-09-24.pdf · d250ea31acbb The public register. Not any link to the DAO, the chain or any address Establishedpublic register
    In full, as shortened in the table above
    0x15bd9ba98353e908c8a9bc003f395ac684cebd405bcab3b6d2d893b63f99223e
    0x56b54fbd87c57d96e2fd89206186d5a266d8e661ffc08561ae051bed5b2f815f
    Chapter VII · 16 September 2024

    "Let's drive BTCC price up"

    A year in, a promoter shows his screen and harvests on camera. The dashboard, the price and the payout all speak for themselves.

    7.1

    The Harvest Party

    "Harvest Party 9.16.24", published by Crypto Tech SXM

    Crypto Tech, whose channel published the training and the launch call, runs a weekly "Harvest Party". The spreadsheet heading on his screen reads "Once a week, on Monday @ 3pm. Let's drive BTCC price up." He shares his screen throughout, and his wallets are public:

    Tech detailaddresses · notes · about 1 min
    RIFT:CPTY:810b17-8306Bb:CG  Crypto Tech's harvest wallet ("Account 4")
      0x810b1777f8F091fb0B9D65FcC0986067908306Bb
    RIFT:CPTY:50Faf8-596e19:CG  Crypto Tech's "BTCC Assets Saving Wallet"
      0x50Faf81B6D35CdcE6c362a206721FA085D596e19

    The tell

    "Some of you may ask why I would want to harvest if the … harvesting cost is more than what I am earning," he tells his audience (17:39–17:52), before answering that harvesting drives the price up. At $0.0125, his 6,748 BFuel cost $84.35, to collect about $67 of BTCC. And the "circulating supply" on the dashboard was not a count of coins. It was a clock.

    1 · The dashboard's numbers were clocks

    2 · Harvesting cost more than it paid

    Interactive · drag the price

    Would harvesting have paid?

    On 16 Sep 2024, claiming 0.99648 BTCC cost Crypto Tech 6,748 BFuel. At the operator's fixed $0.0125 a BFuel, that is $84.65 of fuel for every BTCC harvested. Drag the BTCC price to see when a harvest pays.

    BTCC price
    Fuel cost per BTCC$84.65
    Gain or loss per BTCC

    Fuel per BTCC = 6,748 ÷ 0.99648 = 6,771.84 BFuel; × $0.0125 = $84.65. His spreadsheet's "My Selling Price" is $169.2798. The highest point in the price chart (§3.1) is at most $155.18. Sources under §7.1.

    3 · Who the pool paid

    His explorer screen shows the pool (the explorer labels it "COD20Proxy") paying his harvest wallet 0.99648 BTCC at block 10,307,670 (tx 0xf5cf1a6d…d55b7189) and 1.00655 BTCC a week earlier at block 10,103,810 (tx 0xd59e3150…3509d12f). That wallet is already in the pool's own records: between 28 Oct and 12 Dec 2023 it called stake 25 times, batchStake 3 times, withdrawMiner 10 times and batchWithdrawMiners 3 times. It is the first recipient of the pool's BTCC named in this report other than [0x]34cCC8 itself.

    4 · In his own words

    "People sold everything to buy Boomerang and stopped harvesting, because the price dropped and stagnated around in the 60s."46:47–46:56

    In plain English

    A year in, at the Harvest Party, the "mining" on the promoter's screen cost more to collect than it was worth, the headline numbers were arithmetic, and the price was a quote against a dollar token the creator made. The promoter's answer was to ask members to keep paying anyway, once a week, to hold the price up.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    Everything shown on screen: the dashboard, swap, BFuel purchase, MetaMask and explorer 1221_input_screenshot-yt-harvest-party-2024-09-16_01 to _19.png (hashes in the case's evidence index); transcript 4cfed7914a56 What his screen showed on 16 Sep 2024. The two payouts still have to be read from the chain Leadscreens
    Crypto Tech is the presenter and the channelZoom tile "Crypto Tech" (all screens); referral link "r=CryptoTechSXM" (_18.png · c5e6484b4ae2); the channel name on the recordings it publishedSelf-published identity under his handleEstablishedself-published
    The clock arithmeticDashboard (_04.png · 73467db7491d); unpause at 18:40:44Z (0032_…p2 · 94759125fe07) The supply figure matches exactly and the countdown to the hour, under the UTC−4 assumption Establishedarithmetic · time zone assumed
    The harvest wallet's calls to the pool, Oct–Dec 2023 address-btcc-8e3c8431-20261012T012214Z.json.rows.partial · 9bf587ed8556 41 calls in the 175,000-row floor, named from the published code Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026 · floor
    The addressesSpreadsheet and explorer screens (_02, _15.png) Copied from screen. Both pass EIP-55 with mixed case, which confirms the copy, and neither collides with the 30,524 addresses in the evidence set at the time of that check Establishedchecksum
    Chapter VIII · 24 September 2026

    The window goes dark

    A ledger that only its operator could show, shown badly, and then not at all.

    8.1

    Can anyone read it?

    Every fault the operator's explorer showed when this investigation tried to read it whole

    On a public chain, an investigator, an auditor or a member can pull the complete history of any address, check it against a second source, and get the same answer every time. Over 11 and 12 October 2026, this investigation tried to do exactly that on BitcoinCode, through the only window there is. This is what it found:

    Tech detailtable · notes · about 2 min
    #What was askedWhat the explorer didEvidence
    1A list limited to a block rangeIgnored the range and returned the list from the start2235Z §2
    2Its own address totals (v2 API)"API V2 is disabled", so there are no stated totals to check a pull againstprobe c7087bdc6f98
    3Live contract code and state (eth_call, eth_getCode)"Action not found"2235Z §2
    4Event logs (module=logs, eth_getLogs)No reply within 60 s, even for one block. Payout events can't be read2235Z §2
    5Every transfer of the chain's "USDT"Refused: "address is required". The supply can't be audited2235Z §2
    6Source code of unpublished contractsReturned another, verified contract's details, with no flag. Only the web page says so0105Z §2.1
    7Block rewards"HTTP 500" for every block asked2355 §2
    8Balances at blocks 0 and 1"Balance not found"0006_
    9A long list, page by pageSome pages come back short, with the same rows left out on every readdiagnostic be9b5d4b7e0a
    10The same page twiceA re-read page repeated a row already taken, at block 2,392,078, on six reads. The stop line gives two possible causes (the page not applied, or rows in that block moving across the page boundary) and doesn't pick one. This stopped the pool pull after 175,000 rowspull 9bf587ed8556
    11Internal transactions for an addressReturned two lists merged, rows from the address and rows to it, each paged separately, plus the creation row: 2,001 rows when 1,000 were askeddiagnostic 69f083447971
    12Page 16 of the pool's incoming internal listA row already taken came back again, on six reads, and the pull stopped. The cause is not establishedpull b8871c769d33
    13Internal rows for the "bridge" contract15 calls' rows listed twice, and 7 calls' rows left out2320Z §2
    14The newest blockFrozen at 30,834,158 since 24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z0024_, re-derived
    15The chain's public nodeCertificate expired 24 Sep 2026 06:16:19Z, and not renewed by 12 Oct 20260048_, re-derived

    Some of these are ordinary limits of the explorer software. Others are the explorer giving wrong or unstable answers: 6 and 10 to 13. Together they mean that no complete, repeatable statement of any large account on this chain could be got from the only place found that holds it, as read on 11–12 Oct 2026. The investigation built and tested six versions of its pull tool against these faults, and stopped when the explorer kept producing new ones.

    Transparency was part of the pitch. Introducing the chain on 22 Sep 2023, the presenter said it would become "more transparent" as it gained "more nodes" (08:53–09:00). The wrapped Bitcoin he would put into liquidity was there "to make sure that there is absolute enough transparency" (12:20–12:25), and the airdropped supply "will be transparent with the community, you all can see … on chain" (12:54–13:00). The only window onto that chain refuses or garbles a complete reading of any large account, and has shown nothing new since 24 Sep 2026, as read on 12 Oct 2026.

    In plain English

    Imagine a bank that publishes your statement only on its own website, where the pages sometimes skip lines, sometimes repeat them, shuffle between visits, and since late September show nothing new. Every figure in this report is that bank's account of itself. No second source to check it against has been found.

    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What it can establishStatus
    Faults 1–5SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-11_2235Z.md §2 · 381b2b54b3b3; probe c7087bdc6f98 The replies to those requests on 11 Oct 2026EstablishedNOT re-derived
    Fault 6SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-12_0105Z.md §2.1 · 1f1a285f1daa The API reply against the contract's web pageEstablishedNOT re-derived
    Faults 7–82355_ §2 · 1281132c7089; 0006_ · 73b1f223b21a The failed replies, saved as .failed filesEstablishedNOT re-derived
    Faults 9–10paging-diag-btcc-20261011T220338Z.json · be9b5d4b7e0a; address-btcc-8e3c8431-20261012T012214Z.json.rows.partial · 9bf587ed8556 Repeated reads of the same pages; the stopped pull and its stop line. The repeated row is in the file at block 2,392,078. The cause of fault 10 is not establishedEstablishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Fault 11paging-diag-internal-btcc-20261012T102613Z.json · 69f083447971 Every reply in full. Each page holds exactly offset rows from the address and offset rows to it, plus the creation row on page 1, at offsets 1, 10, 100 and 1,000Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Fault 12address-btcc-8e3c8431-20261012T103221Z.json.rows.partial · b8871c769d33 The stop line. The reply itself wasn't saved, so the cause is not establishedLead
    Fault 13SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-11_2320Z.md §2.6 · c2d83d96cd9d The [0x]556Da7 pull against its call listEstablishedNOT re-derived
    The transparency quotes1233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79What the automatic captions record, at those timestampsEstablishedas said
    8.2

    The explorer went dark

    The explorer stopped five minutes after the node’s certificate expired

    The operator runs the only public explorer found for this chain, scan.bitcoincode.technology. Its newest block is 30,834,158, timestamped 24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z, and there is no block after it. Until then, blocks had been arriving about every three seconds.

    Tech detailnotes · about 1 min

    The explorer’s pages name the chain’s public node as rpc.bitcoincode.technology. On 12 Oct 2026 that node presented a Let’s Encrypt certificate that had already expired. Wallets and browsers refuse an expired certificate by default.

    Animation · the explorer's heartbeat

    Five minutes and thirteen seconds

    06:16:19Z · node certificate expires 06:21:32Z · last block30,834,158 nothing since
    24 Sep 2026

    Schematic, not to scale: each blip stands for many blocks, which were arriving about every three seconds. The two times are exact, from the certificate and the explorer's last block. Sources under "How we know" below.

    The BitcoinCode explorer's block list: block 30834158 '18 days ago', and blocks 30834153 and 30834154 shown as 'Block Mined, awaiting import'
    The explorer’s block list on 12 Oct 2026, 01:30 BST. The last block shows as “18 days ago”, and blocks 30,834,153 and 30,834,154, below it, as “Block Mined, awaiting import…”. “Miner” is the explorer software’s word for a block producer. Cropped from 0034_input_screenshot-explorer-blocks-head_2026-10-12-0030Z.png (sha256 6bd83e84a072…), region x 0–1335, y 0–945, to remove the viewer’s browser details.
    Tech detailnotes · about 1 min

    The rest of the operator’s domain was being kept up. Certificates were renewed on 25 Sep 2026, and a wildcard certificate is valid into November. So the lapse is specific to the chain’s node. The timing suggests the explorer stopped importing blocks when it could no longer connect securely to the node, which would mean the explorer stopped, not necessarily the chain. That is an inference from timing.

    In plain English

    Since 24 Sep 2026, the operator’s explorer, the only public window onto this chain that we know of, has shown members nothing new about their balances or the pool. Whether the chain itself has stopped, or only its explorer, isn’t known.

    Not established

    • Whether the chain is still producing blocks.
    • Whether any other node or connection address exists.
    • Whether the lapse was deliberate or neglect.
    • Whether members were told.
    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    Head 30,834,158 at 2026-09-24 06:21:32Z; the block before is 06:21:29Z 0033_…eth_block_number-1/-2.json 59b2f2b94be3; block pages e1b6fd533e31, eef9c40db8d8 The explorer’s own head, read twice, and its stored block times Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    No block 30,834,159; blocks about every 3 s before the stop 0024_RIFT_btcc-explorer-head-frozen-and-corrections.md · a0f54dc8c2d9 A 404 for that block, and 34,158 blocks in 102,474 s EstablishedNOT re-derived
    The certificate: issuer, serial and dates 0048_input_rpc-cert_leaf-decoded.txt · db1ef01a52f6 The certificate the node presented at 00:48:59Z on 12 Oct 2026 Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    Standard clients refuse the connection (“certificate has expired”) 0028_input_rpc-bitcoincode-head-test.txt · 33ca2a074dcf Three requests at 00:28Z on 12 Oct 2026, from the investigator’s machine Establishedre-read 12 Oct 2026
    No later certificate for rpc.; swap. renewed 25 Sep; valid wildcard 0048_input_crtsh_rpc-…json 0e68dec59f34; 0048_input_crtsh_all-…json 86f942609cd6 Public Certificate Transparency logs up to the query time. crt.sh can lag Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    The explorer names rpc. as the chain’s node 0047_RIFT_btcc-rpc-certificate-expiry.md · a8ff4a307003 The explorer’s page code EstablishedNOT re-derived
    Chapter IX · The verdict

    What was promised, what was delivered

    Every claim tested, and the question the whole case comes down to.

    9.1

    The claims, one by one

    Eighteen statements, from the training of 5 Sep 2023 to the DAO of 14 Feb 2024

    Each verdict describes what the code and the records show. None is a verdict on the speaker’s intent. Where the records can’t settle a claim, the verdict says so.

    #SaidWhat the records showVerdict
    1The NFTs “mine” BTCC00:17–00:42 The NFTs contain no mining or reward code. "Mining" payouts reach holders only from a pool the creator filled from the 21 million it already held FalseNo mining code was found. Holders get coins that already existed
    2“Hash power one kilowatt”, “10 kilowatt”, “a hundred kilowatt”05:00–05:07; 07:04–07:30 “Hash rate” is a number the pool looks up from an unpublished contract that [0x]34cCC8 created, and the owner can swap. No hardware, electricity or hashing appears in the code MisleadingPhysical units attached to an assigned number
    3BFUEL is the “gas fee”, the “electricity fee to mine”05:13–05:44; 08:16–08:33 Under the published code, BFUEL taken at claim is half destroyed and half sent to the fuelReceiver, which [0x]34cCC8 set to itself and never changed in its own transactions. At his own figures, a GT1X uses about 240 BFUEL a day False as describedNot electricity or gas. Terms may have changed since the code went unpublished
    4The BFUEL price “will be fixed forever … always 0.0125 against BTCC”07:37–07:55 The BFUEL contract has no price. 100 million were minted to [0x]34cCC8 at creation, and approved addresses can mint more UnsupportedNo code read sets or protects a price
    5“Mine BTCC every 10 minutes out of the total 7,200 coins … till first [halving], that is four years”14:36–14:47 Under both published versions of the code, the pool paid exactly 50 BTCC per 10 minutes, which is 7,200 a day, for 4 years, then halving. It paid from its own balance, and the owner could withdraw that balance in one call. The code has been unpublished since 22 Nov 2023 Numbers true, label falseA payout timetable from a pre-filled pool
    6“BTCC is indeed 140 years of mining journey”12:06–12:20 The whole supply sat in one address before that address’s first transaction, and the “mining” is that address’s coins paid out of a pool it controls MisleadingHow long it lasts depends on the owner leaving the pool intact
    7“When there are more miners, the price goes up”19:05–19:12 Under the published code, the pool paid a fixed amount, shared by hash rate. Each miner added reduced every other holder’s share Contradictedfor each holder’s payout. The price claim can’t be tested on chain
    8Swap to “WBTC” in real time and “cash out in Bitcoin”08:41–08:56; 16:05–16:23 The only “WBTC” contract read on this chain is a token created by [0x]34cCC8 on 3 Nov 2024, 14 months after the training. Approved addresses can mint it, and the owner can block any address MisleadingOn this chain “WBTC” is a locally made token, not Bitcoin
    9The proof of reserve “is subject to an audit by [Chainlink] … they are auditing our proof of reserve”24:40–24:56 Chainlink describes Proof of Reserve as oracle networks publishing collateral balances on chain, not as an audit of reports a company submits. A web search on 12 Oct 2026 found no Chainlink publication about it No support foundNot shown to be false: a missing record isn’t proof
    10Day-one miners “will receive airdrops from me of some [B fuel]”12:44–12:55 The entire first BFUEL supply, 100 million, was minted to [0x]34cCC8 on 1 Oct 2023 Consistent withthe speaker controlling BFUEL supply. Doesn’t establish who controls [0x]34cCC8
    11“Now everything is community’s decision”; “giving power back to the community”02:02–02:18; 25:47–25:57 One address created every contract read here except one swap pool, held the whole supply, filled the pool and set itself as fuel receiver. Under the published code, as owner it could upgrade, pause or empty the pool. It used the first two of those powers (§4.3). No use of the third has been found in its own transactions ContradictedControl sits with one address
    12“4,500+ miners ready to mine on day one … I foresee 50,000”12:20–12:42 In the pool’s first 16 hours, 490 different addresses called stake or batchStake, [0x]34cCC8 among them. Miner counts by date weren’t computed Not tested
    13“Today the chain is live … in 24 hours the minting will start, and on 29th we will start mining”22 Sep 2023 · 01:16–01:31 The miner contracts were created on 23 Sep 2023, on time. The pool that pays the “mining” was created on 2 Oct 2023 and unpaused at 18:40:44Z Half keptMinting on time, mining three days late
    14“It will be three dollars … because I am putting in liquidity”, against “wrapped Bitcoin”22 Sep 2023 · 12:03–12:41 290 BTCC against 870 of a “USDT” that [0x]34cCC8 had created 52 minutes earlier: exactly $3.00. The “WBTC” liquidity came 13 months later, with a token [0x]34cCC8 created that day MisleadingThe price was real. The “dollar” behind it was the creator’s own
    15“If you have the node you have the control … I will have zero control”22 Sep 2023 · 09:36–09:49 The pool’s published code has no nodes. The only validator registration found was made by [0x]34cCC8, for 0x5fB621. [0x]34cCC8 replaced the pool’s code three times, then made 21 calls naming 358 staked miners; in the 18 cases read, the miner went to [0x]34cCC8 Contradicted
    16“My only job will be to collect as much [BTCC] as possible from you guys … sell it to me”22 Sep 2023 · 09:49–10:09 In May 2025, [0x]34cCC8 swapped 3,500,000 of its own “USDT” for at least 26,922 BTCC Consistent withWhose BTCC it bought is not established. Paid in a “USDT” its creator made
    17“With [BFuel], a uniform … a universal cost is attached to every [BTCC] that is mined”22 Sep 2023 · 05:11–05:26 In Sep 2024, a promoter paid $84.35 in BFuel to claim 0.99648 BTCC worth about $67, at a fuel price set on the operator’s own page MisleadingA fixed cost that could exceed what it collected
    18A DAO “registered in United States”: “I will also have one vote. We all will be equal”14 Feb 2024 · 26:49–31:16 No US registration was searched for. The only “Affiliate Marketing 3.0” found is a UK LLP of Sep 2025, in which a member named Shavez Ahmed Siddiqui holds more than half (and under three quarters) of the votes and can appoint or remove a majority of its management Not supportedThe name match is not proof of a link
    How we know
    ClaimFile · sha256What the file can establishStatus
    Claims 1–12 and verdicts 0040_RIFT_btcc-shavez-claims-vs-chain.md · 78b412f69da4 Each claim tested against chapters II to VII Establishedas each row’s sources allow
    Claims 13–181233_input_yt-transcript_meeting-close-out-2023-09-22.txt · 906055413e79; 1233_input_yt-transcript_ceo-shavez-session-2024-02-14.txt · 7041cdefe3b2; 1221_input_…harvest-party…; and the sources under §2.1 to §7.1Each row as its chapter's sources allowEstablishedas each row’s sources allow
    WBTC ([0x]53b71E) created by [0x]34cCC8 on 3 Nov 2024 0028_RIFT_btcc-txinfo-create-53b71E.json · 52ccb0a683c8 The creation transaction Establishedre-derived 12 Oct 2026
    WBTC: unlimited minting by approved addresses, blocking, 18 decimals. BFUEL: further minting. Whether another WBTC existed in Sep 2023 0040_ rows 4 and 8; 2355_ §5 The published code. The explorer’s token list beyond page 1 wasn’t read EstablishedNOT re-derived · earlier WBTC not established
    No Chainlink publication found 0040_ row 9 One web search on 12 Oct 2026. An image held in the HyperFund investigation (waas-vault-horizon-por-chainlink.jpg) bears on it Not establishedNOT re-derived
    490 addresses called stake or batchStake in the first 16 hours 0015_RIFT_btcc-pool-funding-and-control.md §2 · b62351cf0827 The pool’s first 1,000 transaction rows EstablishedNOT re-derived
    9.2

    Is it a blockchain?

    The test, applied, so readers can judge for themselves

    "Blockchain" isn't a legal term, and software alone doesn't settle it. What people rely on when they trust a public blockchain is a short list of properties. Here is the list, with BitcoinCode's answer to each:

    The propertyBitcoinCodeStatus
    Blocks are produced and chained togetherThey were, about every three seconds, up to the explorer's last block on 24 Sep 2026. It has shown none since (§8.2) Not shown
    Anyone can send a transactionThousands of addresses did, up to 24 Sep 2026. None has been shown sinceNot shown
    Anyone can read the full ledgerOnly through the operator's explorer, which can't be read whole and has shown nothing new since 24 Sep 2026 (as read on 12 Oct 2026) No
    Anyone can check it independently, with their own copyNo independent node or explorer found; the one published node presented an expired certificate when checked on 12 Oct 2026 Not shown
    Who keeps the ledger is open and accountableRotating signers. The creator registered a validator, which isn't among the producers sampled. How the signers were admitted is unknown Not shown
    No single party creates the moneyAll BTCC in one address at the start; the chain's "USDT" minted in round millions into two wallets, every mint read signed by the creator or an address it switched on No
    The rules can't be changed at willThe pool's code was replaced three times by its owner, twice with unpublished code No

    In plain English

    BitcoinCode was a blockchain in the narrow, technical sense: it chained blocks together, at least until 24 Sep 2026, the last block its explorer shows. It is not one in the sense that matters to anyone holding its coins. Nobody outside can read it whole or check it, no way out to outside value has been found, and the money read and the pool's rules trace back to one address. A fairer description is an operator-run ledger that uses blockchain software.

    The choice is yours

    How far does the rabbit hole go?

    You can stop here, with the story. Or you can open every "How we know" in this report and check each claim against the file it came from, down to its hash.

    Written for anyone who wants to check the work · every figure tied to a hashed file

    §

    Who is named, and on what basis

    Self-published roles and public registers only

    Companies House: Affiliate Marketing 3.0 LLP (OC458239)

    Source. The LLP's application to register (LLIN01) and its certificate of incorporation, dated 24 Sep 2025. Basis: a public register.

    What it records. Two designated members, Shavez Ahmed SIDDIQUI and Joseph TRZEJA. Shavez Ahmed Siddiqui is also recorded as the person with significant control:

    • more than 50% but less than 75% of the voting rights;
    • the same share of surplus assets on a winding up;
    • the right to appoint or remove a majority of the LLP's management.

    What it can't establish. Any link between the LLP and BitcoinCode, the 2023 training, or any address here. Nor that the member on the register is the presenter: that rests on the name and on the training's "Affiliate Marketing 2.0" branding, not on the register. The LLP was formed two years after the training.

    0055_input_companies-house-OC458239-llin01-2025-09-24.pdf · d250ea31acbb · re-read 12 Oct 2026. Personal details beyond names and roles are left out.

    §

    What comes next

    Three questions bigger than this chain

    Every section marks its own limits in its "How we know" box. Three questions reach beyond any one section, and the next parts of this audit take them up:

    §

    Evidence

    Addresses and files behind every statement

    Addresses. How to read a tag is set out at the start. Each tag was checked against its full address, with its EIP-55 checksum computed, and run through a lookalike-collision check across the case evidence set. None collided. The three untagged addresses have been submitted to the Hashbook register as candidates.

    Links. Addresses, transactions and blocks on this chain link to the operator's explorer, scan.bitcoincode.technology. Checked by hand on the afternoon of 12 Oct 2026, its front page opened but could not load blocks or transactions, so a link may open without data. The full value is printed beside every link so it can be checked without the explorer. Two transactions read from Crypto Tech's screen are shown as his screen showed them, shortened; they link to their blocks instead.

    Recordings. Every quoted timestamp links to that moment in the recording. Each recording was matched on YouTube on 12 Oct 2026 by its title, channel and length against the transcript filed for it:

    A recording can be taken down or edited after this date. The transcripts and screenshots filed under Files are the record this report rests on; the links are there for convenience.

    Marks: the Bitcoin logo is in the public domain; the Ethereum logo is by the Ethereum Foundation, used under CC BY 3.0. BitcoinCode and its "WBTC" are shown by a "?" coin in the purple of the operator's own explorer (#5A43A4), sampled from 1233_input_screenshot-yt-meeting-close-out-2023-09-22_01.png.

    RIFT:CPTY:34cCC8-1Bb8Ba:CG   creator of every contract here except [0x]2C06D9
      0x34cCC892b67C873853D7a7050f5Df5B2781Bb8Ba
    RIFT:CURIO:8e3C84-8C92aE:CG  staking ("mining") pool
      0x8e3C843104e155A90fcB0CF0deb6756D688C92aE
    RIFT:CURIO:700F05-4759f0:CG  StakingV1, first code
      0x700F05b0c90DCdd5d75ae7106fed7B7ed44759f0
    RIFT:CURIO:3558e7-6807eD:CG  StakingV1 v2
      0x3558e707f29f589c99585B17bB217267B56807eD
    RIFT:CURIO:960a62-c7D550:CG  unpublished, 21 Nov 2023
      0x960a6279E55C6E0635fea61CFa268376Dcc7D550
    RIFT:CURIO:978a93-2EE710:CG  unpublished, 22 Nov 2023
      0x978a93FBFf996d5C87bE5D5616354327be2EE710
    RIFT:CURIO:b116db-B0d0c2:CG  "property" contract
      0xb116dbC19873a6d8Dec92e960ef229ffbBB0d0c2
    RIFT:CURIO:e99aD6-EA1B35:CG  BFUEL
      0xe99aD64420A20aF4d02806e2cCEBe693d4EA1B35
    RIFT:CURIO:53b71E-642f09:CG  the chain's "WBTC"
      0x53b71Ed5900f035d775638115f54681c86642f09
    RIFT:CURIO:428638-dd821B:CG  ZEON GT1X
      0x4286388ad684515627464dF221b59Cc5C2dd821B
    RIFT:CURIO:c4256C-8A3A26:CG  ZEON GT1X (unverified)
      0xc4256CeE90c418DDE89163606532Ea6Ed98A3A26
    RIFT:CURIO:371d9C-E9e054:CG  ZEON GT10X
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      0x286F4310551D634Ef485a9bEE962f19cbb0AcA80
    RIFT:CPTY:aB472A-E7878A:CG   "USDT" no. 3
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    RIFT:CPTY:c6aFd2-36e27C:CG   largest chain-USDT wallet read
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    RIFT:CPTY:556Da7-fA82f1:CG   the bridge contract
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    RIFT:CURIO:445465-0ED98E:CG  wrapped BTCC; by [0x]34cCC8, 2 Oct 2023
      0x44546571729D1CC8c8DD680A36D80aD8E30ED98E
    RIFT:CURIO:6F8FC8-865e29:CG  swap router; by [0x]34cCC8, 2 Oct 2023
      0x6F8FC88C42E829a6F7eE8B823E043CB1d4865e29
    RIFT:CURIO:9C80AF-d6001F:CG  "USDT" no. 1; by [0x]34cCC8, 3 Oct 2023
      0x9C80AF130278c14DB04A0bB2Cc9a0F0466d6001F
    RIFT:CURIO:7bB89C-ff3B0c:CG  "USDT" no. 2; by [0x]34cCC8, 5 Oct 2023
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    RIFT:CURIO:8E421B-f8B9B9:CG  by [0x]34cCC8, 22 Feb 2024; not read
      0x8E421B92A26721C46332D063b883a4e8e1f8B9B9
    RIFT:CURIO:c582da-42DF0e:CG  by [0x]34cCC8, 22 Feb 2024; not read
      0xc582da428B307991771046cbFEda909f5642DF0e
    RIFT:CPTY:810b17-8306Bb:CG   Crypto Tech harvest wallet
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    RIFT:CPTY:50Faf8-596e19:CG   Crypto Tech saving wallet
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    (no tag yet)                 validator registered by [0x]34cCC8
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    (no tag yet)                 allowed to mint chain-USDT, 6-24 Oct 2023
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    Files. Paths are under Reality Check FORENSIC Reports/, onchain-rpc/out/ or RC_CANON/handovers/. Files already in the case manifest, or in a save run's .sha256 list, matched when hashed again for this report. The pulls and diagnostic written on 12 Oct 2026 are registered in the case manifest.

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    onchain-rpc/out/btcc-usdt-mint-txinfo-20261012T105758Z.json
      c2087327ed0df4ee62fd7deeaaeb60f2355ac32a7868c23d4aafb4c6f93f0654
    session_inputs/2026-10-11/2250_RIFT_556da7-bridgeToken-decode.py
      a34a62e91d05a1f67d5b34a5a9e9cb73d5031c78e7270ceec022efff3efe6173
    RC_CANON/inbox/HYPERFUND/BURNLIST_btcc-556da7-bridgeToken_2026-10-11_2250Z.csv
      732ce2ffd683aa2ee05b6ad4edb1b10132f9b3ff07eea5b7de40e842d3950e01
    RC_CANON/handovers/SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-11_2235Z.md
      381b2b54b3b34c477570c1b9d2a9f1b30ac20bb7b7357acfdff2f03c52051a3a
    RC_CANON/handovers/SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-11_2320Z.md
      c2d83d96cd9d5f17587113f9db17946fcfcd4e8ea199dd589044048019e104d4
    RC_CANON/handovers/SESSION_HANDOVER_RIFT_2026-10-12_0105Z.md
      1f1a285f1daa3b8895fea04a9cbe8fa71044435f46db8a3e93b4d10ce3ed76f5

    Source of every on-chain record: scan.bitcoincode.technology, the operator’s own explorer, read between 11 and 12 Oct 2026. Its state is as at its last block, 24 Sep 2026 06:21:32Z.